The previous two chapters explored how choices concerning your speech preparation, speech performance, and listening can help you practice ethical communication. This chapter introduces standpoint theory to further enrich that understanding.

We will first explain standpoint theory and the related concept of positionality. We will then turn to the ideas of intersectionality and the mythical norm. We will end the chapter by using these theories and concepts to reflect again on the ethics of public speaking.

Standpoint Theory

Standpoint theory emerged from feminist philosophy in the 1970s and 1980s to help explain how we gain knowledge and form perspectives.^[1] The theory suggests that our standpoint—which is produced by our social identities—influences our knowledge of the world. As philosophy scholar Briana Toole explains, “Knowledge is sensitive to features like your race, your sex, your gender, your sexual orientation, your class, your religious affiliation, and so on.”^[2] Our social identities impact how we are perceived and interact with the world. In other words, our social identities play a role in how we are treated, what we are (or are not) encouraged or expected to do, where we can (or cannot) easily go, and where and when we are invited to speak. Those experiences influence what we know.

For instance, a dark-skinned American Sikh man wearing a turban is more likely in the United States to be treated with suspicion (or even hate) and mistaken as Muslim than, say, an American white man wearing a baseball cap.^[3] Consequently, the Sikh man likely knows more about racism, islamophobia, and microaggressions in the United States than the white man, who is less likely to experience them.

Positionalities

Standpoint theory contends that we differ in our access to knowledge because our standpoints are differently positioned. Notice here the word positioned. That relates to the concept of a positionality, or a person’s location (or position) in relation to others in social categories of difference. Such social categories include ethnicity, gender, sexuality, physical ability, religion, citizenship, socioeconomic class, occupation, and so on. The American Sikh man and American white man, for example, have different positionalities regarding their ethnicity and religion. However, the men share the positionalities of nationality and gender.

A positionality, then, is largely the same as a social identity, but it recognizes that social identities typically carry and communicate cultural meanings through their distinctions from others within that category. In the social identity category of “physical ability,” someone who is physically able-bodied carries cultural associations that are different from those carried by someone who is visibly physically disabled, which differ from a person who is invisibly physically disabled.

Power

Different cultural meanings matter because they typically translate into differing degrees of societal power. In other words, a society will grant privileges to some positionalities within a social category. Physically able-bodied people, for example, appear regularly in visual media and school curricula, can expect most spaces and transportation to be designed for them, and are likely to be included in group activities. Cultures accord less privilege to others who differ within a category. Invisibly physically disabled people, for instance, are frequently hassled for using aids or needing extra help, since their need is not visibly obvious. Society oppresses and even denies others within a category. Visibly physically disabled people may have to research routes and spaces to ensure they can access them, are often mistaken as being mentally challenged or talked to like children, and face job discrimination.

To help articulate such differentiations, we can borrow from Toole the definitions of a dominantly situated positionality as “a knower that does not occupy a position of social oppression” (or one that enjoys social privilege and power) and a marginally situated positionality as “a knower that does occupy a position of oppression.”^[4]

A notable irony is that cultural power is inversely related to knowledge.

It is also important to note that while the terms “dominantly situated” and “marginally situated” imply two separate categories, you might think of positionalities instead as existing along scales of difference—from more dominantly situated to more marginally situated. For example, in terms of housing in the US, we might recognize homeowners as more dominantly situated than people who rent an apartment or home—and even then, we might differentiate among the types and neighborhoods of homes owned or rented. Shifting toward more marginally situated positionalities, we can identify people who are in temporary shelters (due to emergencies or personal safety) as less marginally situated than people who are homeless long-term.

In addition, it is important to state again that how a positionality is situated is based on social or cultural associations rather than anything inherent or true about the people who occupy it.

Of course, none of us consists of a single social identity or positionality, which is why we turn next to intersectionality.

Intersectionality and the Mythical Norm

Intersectionality is a concept coined in 1989 by legal scholar Kimberlé Crenshaw.^[5] It suggests that our social identities consist of multiple features that combine in meaningful ways to create intersecting forms of privilege and oppression. Crenshaw uses the example of Black women to illustrate how they are more likely to experience the intersection of both racism and sexism, unlike white women (who encounter sexism) or Black men (who deal with racism).

Each of us has developed a standpoint that consists of intersecting positionalities—some of which are more dominantly situated and some of which are more marginally situated. You can use the “wheel of power/privilege” to begin locating some of your positionalities and reflect on how they intersect and impact your experiences and knowledge.

You’ll notice that “power” is located at the wheel’s center. The closer one’s positionality approaches the center, the more social power, privilege, and prestige it is granted in the United States.

Positionalities near the center of power are also more likely to be associated with cultural norms. That is, they produce and reflect a culture’s standards or expectations for desirable (or normative) behaviors, values, and appearances. Having a driver’s license, for example, is expected and assumed as “normal” in the United States. That association contributes to its social power and privilege. Most of our transportation infrastructure is designed for car drivers, and a driver’s license is accepted for identification purposes when voting or buying alcohol, for instance.

Poet, professor, and activist Audre Lorde has labeled this phenomenon—what we might think of as the center of the intersectionality wheel—as the “mythical norm.” She explains, “In America, this norm is usually defined as white, thin, male, young, heterosexual, Christian, and financially secure. It is with this mythical norm that the trappings of power reside within this society.”^[6]

This norm is mythical because it is not actually normal or typical. Very few (if any) people occupy all the empowered social identities. Indeed, we are each unique. That means, of course, that the mythical norm does not necessarily correspond with the majority population. Rather, it consists of characteristics perceived as “normal” when, in fact, they are atypical! Nonetheless, we tend to use them to measure people against, including ourselves, because our culture deems them preferable. We might publicly downplay our differences from the mythical norm to appear “normal” or desirable.

The mythical norm helps explain why public discourse can be so difficult, especially when discussing social justice issues. Because dominantly situated positionalities typically avoid encounters with social oppression, they are more likely to discount or reject claims and evidence (by marginally situated positionalities) that social oppression exists.

Recall in chapter 4 that one reason social protest functions productively is because it can help people with privilege and power acknowledge societal inequity. However, that chapter also explains that social protest as a form of communication—often used by socially marginalized knowers—is typically critiqued as inappropriate, since it does not meet societal norms for civil discourse.

Standpoint and Ethical Rhetoric

Now that we’ve established standpoint theory, positionality, intersectionality, and the mythical norm, let’s return briefly to the three ethical considerations considered in the previous two chapters: speech preparation, speech performance, and listening.

Speech preparation: Part of being responsible to your audience—and doing the hard but often invisible work of speech preparation—is recognizing the opportunities and challenges posed by your standpoint for the speaking situation. Imagine you are speaking as a person with a marginally situated positionality about a topic to an audience with dominantly situated positionalities. Consider how sharing your experiences might offer the audience something important and meaningful. Your standpoint can help them recognize an issue that may seem obvious to you but not to them.

Of course, you must also anticipate that such an audience may resist your perspective and, accordingly, you should be prepared to address counterarguments and cite outside sources as well. On the flip side, if your audience or the speaking occasion seem odd or unfamiliar to you, perhaps because you and they occupy different social identities, treat the audience with respect. Learn as much as you can about them and the occasion and adjust your speech preparation accordingly.

Speech performance: Recall from chapter 5 that central to an ethical speech performance is using communication that, according to NCA’s credo, “enhances human worth, human life, and dignity.” Acknowledging your standpoint should help you recognize your assumptions about what topics are worth talking about, who is worth talking to, and how to address them. Becoming more cognizant and even critical of your assumptions may help you adopt the five ethical behaviors discussed in that chapter: avoiding plagiarism, conducting ethical research, practicing ethical and sound reasoning, using language carefully, and taking responsibility for the consequences of your rhetoric.

For instance, recognize that not everyone will be similarly impacted by your language and ideas. Research beyond your own standpoint to learn how people with marginally situated positionalities may be affected if your language and ideas are adopted. For example, if you advocate for an organization to move its meetings to a distant location, away from the “noise” of loud buses and “people on the street,” your speech will fail to account for the needs or humanity of people who rely on walking and public transportation.

Listening: Similarly, consider how your standpoint plays a role in who you listen to and how. Which speakers do you readily deem authoritative, and which might you be inclined to discount or dismiss? What kinds of people tend to speak in the communities you are a member of, and who must fight to be heard? Why?

If you become more aware of your standpoint, then you might choose to listen more attentively to people with different positionalities. Furthermore, you might recognize limits to your knowledge due to your dominantly situated positionalities and remain open to speakers who share different experiences.