{"id":50,"date":"2025-05-26T16:44:10","date_gmt":"2025-05-26T16:44:10","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/pressbooks.palni.org\/theexcitingdynamicsofstateandlocalgovernment\/?post_type=chapter&#038;p=50"},"modified":"2025-07-29T21:22:08","modified_gmt":"2025-07-29T21:22:08","slug":"governors-and-the-executive-branch","status":"publish","type":"chapter","link":"https:\/\/pressbooks.palni.org\/theexcitingdynamicsofstateandlocalgovernment\/chapter\/governors-and-the-executive-branch\/","title":{"raw":"Governors and the Executive Branch","rendered":"Governors and the Executive Branch"},"content":{"raw":"<div class=\"textbox textbox--examples\"><header class=\"textbox__header\">\r\n<p class=\"textbox__title\">Chapter Summary<\/p>\r\n\r\n<\/header>\r\n<div class=\"textbox__content\">\r\n<p class=\"import-pf\">Governors are often viewed as the most identifiable political leaders in a state, usurping the highest leaders in the legislative and executive branches and the heads of the political parties. Their formal power, however, can be limited depending on their powers in appointments, budgeting, and vetoes. This chapter begins with an overview of the chief executive, exploring the formal and informal powers while comparing the candidates who have gubernatorial ambitions to those who seek power in the statehouse.<\/p>\r\n\r\n<\/div>\r\n<\/div>\r\n<div class=\"textbox textbox--learning-objectives\"><header class=\"textbox__header\">\r\n<p class=\"textbox__title\">Student Learning Objectives<\/p>\r\n\r\n<\/header>\r\n<div class=\"textbox__content\">\r\n<p class=\"import-paft\">Upon completion of this chapter, students should be able to:<\/p>\r\n\r\n<ol>\r\n \t<li>Understand the organization and structure of the executive branch.<\/li>\r\n \t<li>Identify the key positions and their responsibilities within the executive branch, including the governor, lieutenant governor, attorney general, secretary of state, auditor, treasurer, comptroller, and public service commissioner.<\/li>\r\n \t<li>Evaluate the power of a governor on the basis of elected executive positions and appointed executive positions.<\/li>\r\n \t<li>Assess the characteristics of those who serve in the governor\u2019s office, including how they are different from individuals who serve in the state legislature.<\/li>\r\n \t<li>Analyze the different executive and legislative powers of a governor and consider the impact these distinctions make on policy.<\/li>\r\n<\/ol>\r\n<\/div>\r\n<\/div>\r\n<div class=\"textbox textbox--exercises\"><header class=\"textbox__header\">\r\n<p class=\"textbox__title\">Focus Questions<\/p>\r\n\r\n<\/header>\r\n<div class=\"textbox__content\">\r\n<p class=\"import-paft\">These questions illustrate the main concepts covered in the chapter and should help guide discussion as well as enable students to critically analyze and apply the material covered.<\/p>\r\n<p class=\"import-ulf\" style=\"margin-left: 18pt; text-indent: 18pt;\">How do governors work with (and sometimes against) state legislatures in functions that both institutions share? What impact do institutional differences (i.e., full time versus part time, term limited versus non\u2013term limited) have on their power?<\/p>\r\n<p class=\"import-ul\" style=\"margin-left: 18pt; text-indent: 18pt;\">What role do other positions in the executive branch play in state government?<\/p>\r\n<p class=\"import-ul\" style=\"margin-left: 18pt; text-indent: 18pt;\">Why do governors tend to be weaker than state legislatures in policymaking authority?<\/p>\r\n<p class=\"import-ul\" style=\"margin-left: 18pt; text-indent: 18pt;\">What can the selection of a position in the executive branch (elected by the people or appointed by the governor) tell us about the power and authority of the governor in the state?<\/p>\r\n<p class=\"import-ul\" style=\"margin-left: 18pt; text-indent: 18pt;\">How do governors play a role in lawmaking and influencing the budget?<\/p>\r\n<p class=\"import-ul\" style=\"margin-left: 18pt; text-indent: 18pt;\">What makes campaigns and elections for governor more expensive, more desirable, and more competitive compared to other state government races?<\/p>\r\n\r\n<\/div>\r\n<\/div>\r\n<h1 class=\"import-ah\">Overview of the Executive Branch<\/h1>\r\n<p class=\"import-paft\">The executive branch at both state and federal levels is tasked with the implementation of the laws, a tremendous undertaking given the vast responsibility of government in the twenty-first century. In many ways, the executive branch at the state level mimics its counterpart at the national level. The governor serves as the chief executive, just as the president does, and they exercise control of the bureaucracy in addition to their own staff and cabinet.<sup class=\"import-enref\">[footnote]Abney and Lauth, \u201cGovernor as Chief Administrator.\u201d[\/footnote]<\/sup> Some positions within the executive branch at both levels even share the same name and are given similar duties: for example, the attorney general represents the government in lawsuits, and the treasurer is responsible for the government\u2019s funds.<\/p>\r\n<p class=\"import-p\" style=\"text-indent: 36pt;\">While there is some overlap between titles and responsibilities, a quick review of the state executive branch reveals many differences between the federal and state governments but also variations among states. The secretary of state role exists in federal and state government, but their responsibility is quite different; at the federal level, they lead diplomacy and are deeply involved in international relations, while at the state level, their primary responsibility lies in running elections. All states employ a governor but not all utilize the role of lieutenant governor. For states that do not have a secretary of state to run elections, that responsibility is given to the lieutenant governor. These distinctions can be quite confusing, but distinguishing among the powers, responsibilities, and officers within the executive branch gives us a greater understanding of the challenges but also the power that is unique to the executive relative to the legislative or judicial branches.<\/p>\r\n\r\n<h1 class=\"import-ah\">What Is Executive Power and Authority?<\/h1>\r\n<p class=\"import-paft\">The <span style=\"border: none windowtext 0pt; padding: 0;\"><strong class=\"import-b\">governor<\/strong><\/span> serves as the chief executive for the executive branch, instantly giving them a higher level of authority and status, particularly with regard to informal power, compared to the legislative branch (as discussed in <span style=\"border: none windowtext 0pt; padding: 0;\"><span class=\"import-xref\">Chapter 4<\/span><\/span>) and the judicial branch (coming up next in <span style=\"border: none windowtext 0pt; padding: 0;\"><span class=\"import-xref\">Chapter 6<\/span><\/span>).<sup class=\"import-enref\">[footnote]Hamman, \u201cCareer Experience.\u201d[\/footnote]<\/sup> Neither the state legislature nor the state court system has a single leader with seemingly as much power as the governor. Though the different manifestations of power will be explored more later in this chapter (in <span style=\"border: none windowtext 0pt; padding: 0;\"><span class=\"import-xref\">\u201cWhat Are Executive and Legislative Gubernatorial Powers?\u201d<\/span><\/span>), the broadest understanding of executive power is derived from the constitution and from the governors themselves.<\/p>\r\n<p class=\"import-p\" style=\"text-indent: 36pt;\">The constitutional power of the governor outlines the rights and responsibilities of the office itself. These powers are given to anyone who occupies the office and do not vary from governor to governor, with the rare exception of constitutional changes (discussed in <span style=\"border: none windowtext 0pt; padding: 0;\"><span class=\"import-xref\">Chapter 3<\/span><\/span>).<sup class=\"import-enref\">[footnote]National Governors Association, \u201cGovernors: Powers and Authority.\u201d[\/footnote]<\/sup> The power of the governor as chief executive does vary slightly across states, but there are some notable constants.<\/p>\r\n<p class=\"import-p\" style=\"text-indent: 36pt;\">Typically, governors and the executive branch as a whole are given slightly less power through the state constitution than is the legislative branch.<sup class=\"import-enref\">[footnote]Dinan, American State Constitutional Tradition.[\/footnote]<\/sup> This is notable because the federal government\u2019s separation of powers is proudly \u201cbalanced\u201d between each of the branches. No such presumption exists in the states. The explanation for intentionally creating a slightly stronger state legislature and a slightly weaker governor and executive branch is rooted in the history of American government, particularly in the colonial era.<sup class=\"import-enref\">[footnote]Tarr, Understanding State Constitutions, 72.[\/footnote]<\/sup> When governors were both royal appointees and given substantial power, the colonists recognized their own limited rights and never forgot the challenges of having powerful and appointed chief executives. Though some positions within the executive branch are appointed (a discussion we will elaborate on later in <span style=\"border: none windowtext 0pt; padding: 0;\"><span class=\"import-xref\">\u201cWhat Are Executive and Legislative Gubernatorial Powers?\u201d<\/span><\/span>), the former-colonists-turned-founding-fathers of state constitutions deliberately constructed executive and legislative bodies that were elected and thus responsive to the people. These are sometimes also referred to as \u201cnonunified\u201d executive branches.<sup class=\"import-enref\">[footnote]Kousser and Phillips, Power of American Governors, 17.[\/footnote]<\/sup> (The debate between elections and appointments in filling roles in the judicial branch, with good arguments for both, will be addressed in <span style=\"border: none windowtext 0pt; padding: 0;\"><span class=\"import-xref\">Chapter 6<\/span><\/span>.)<\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n[caption id=\"attachment_194\" align=\"alignleft\" width=\"500\"]<img class=\"wp-image-194\" src=\"http:\/\/pressbooks.palni.org\/theexcitingdynamicsofstateandlocalgovernment\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/79\/2025\/06\/5.1.jpg\" alt=\"Nikki Haley speaks at a podium indoors.\" width=\"500\" height=\"333\" \/> <strong><span class=\"import-fighn\">Figure 5.1 - <\/span>South Carolina Governor Nikki Haley Giving Address at a Public Event in 2014<br \/>Source: \"<a href=\"https:\/\/commons.wikimedia.org\/wiki\/File:South_Carolina_Gov._Nikki_Haley_joins_U.S._military_service_members_and_community_business_partners_for_the_launch_of_Operation_Palmetto_Employment,_a_statewide_military_employment_initiative_aimed_at_making_140226-F-XH297-660.jpg\"><span class=\"mw-page-title-main\">South Carolina Gov. Nikki Haley joins U.S. military service members and community business partners ...<\/span><\/a>\" by Staff Sgt. Jorge Intriago\/United States Air Force on Wikimedia Commons \/ <a href=\"https:\/\/creativecommons.org\/public-domain\/pdm\/\">Public Domain.<\/a><\/strong>[\/caption]\r\n<p class=\"import-p\" style=\"text-indent: 36pt;\">In addition to having slightly less power than their legislatures, governors are given traditional authority over the bureaucracy and the implementation of the laws.<sup class=\"import-enref\">[footnote]Tarr, Understanding State Constitutions, 156; National Governors Association, \u201cGovernors: Powers and Authority\u201d; Woods and Baranowski, \u201cGovernors and the Bureaucracy.\u201d[\/footnote]<\/sup> They oversee the executive branch, including appointments for key leadership positions, and in states where they do use judicial appointments, governors play a role in nominating candidates to the bench.<sup class=\"import-enref\">[footnote]McLeod, \u201cParty on the Bench.\u201d[\/footnote]<\/sup> This oversight underpins the justification for executive orders, which enable a governor to make policy proclamations of limited authority in the name of fully executing the laws. This allows governors one way to fulfill their own goals for leading the state while in office. They also are involved in the legislative process, promoting legislation that aligns with their objectives but also theoretically represents the interests of the entire state, differing from the primary legislative focus, which emphasizes district and constituent benefits. Appointments, and particularly the breadth and depth of offices in which positions are appointed by the governor, demonstrate an essential constitutional power.<\/p>\r\n<p class=\"import-p\" style=\"text-indent: 36pt;\">Another <span style=\"border: none windowtext 0pt; padding: 0;\"><strong class=\"import-b\">formal power<\/strong><\/span> listed in the constitution for governors is introducing the state budget.<sup class=\"import-enref\">[footnote]Council of State Governments, Book of the States.[\/footnote]<\/sup> This is a shared responsibility, much like appointments and passing legislation, because the governor requires collaboration with the state legislature in order to complete it. After all, it is the legislature that must pass the budget through both chambers in order for it to make it to the governor\u2019s desk again for signature. The governor has some latitude in the budgeting process, though, especially in considering statewide needs and interests and major initiatives that align with their own agenda and match or reinforce the goals of the legislature. Depending on the legislative and budgeting cycle, the governor can indicate the important points of the state budget in the annual state of the state address and in appeals to the public. These signal to the constituents what the priorities are and what the governor deems most important. Internally, the governor must work with the leaders in the legislature to advocate for their budget items and work to align goals across both branches of government.<sup class=\"import-enref\">[footnote]Kousser and Phillips, Power of American Governors.[\/footnote]<\/sup><\/p>\r\n<p class=\"import-p\" style=\"text-indent: 36pt;\">Finally, the last major constitutional power of governors lies in their ability to approve or kill legislation, a vital step in the policymaking process at the state level. When both chambers of the legislature have passed a bill, it lands on the desk of the governor. Governors can sign the bill into law, and the process, from a creation perspective, is complete (the real work in implementation, though, has just begun for the executive branch). But what happens when a governor disagrees with the bill? Governors have veto power, which gives them the authority to reject a bill in its presented form, forcing the state legislature to either redress the bill to accommodate the governor\u2019s wishes, override the veto with a supermajority of legislative support in both chambers, or abandon the bill entirely to revisit at another time or in a different way.<sup class=\"import-enref\">[footnote]McGrath, Rogowski, and Ryan et al., \u201cPower of Institutional Design,\u201d 31\u201347; Wilkins and Young, \u201cInfluence of Governors,\u201d 557\u2013575; Kousser and Phillips, Power of American Governors.[\/footnote]<\/sup><\/p>\r\n<p class=\"import-p\" style=\"text-indent: 36pt;\"><span style=\"border: none windowtext 0pt; padding: 0;\"><strong class=\"import-b\">Veto power<\/strong><\/span> can vary and will be discussed in this chapter later in greater detail (see <span style=\"border: none windowtext 0pt; padding: 0;\"><span class=\"import-xref\">\u201cWhat Are Executive and Legislative Gubernatorial Powers?\u201d<\/span><\/span>). But this formalized power protects the executive branch from an overpowering legislature and offers an important institutional check in the lawmaking process.<sup class=\"import-enref\">[footnote]Herzik and Wiggins, \u201cGovernors vs. Legislatures,\u201d 841.[\/footnote]<\/sup><\/p>\r\n<p class=\"import-p\" style=\"text-indent: 36pt;\">In addition to the formal powers that are given to every person who occupies the governor\u2019s office, each governor has the opportunity to utilize <span style=\"border: none windowtext 0pt; padding: 0;\"><strong class=\"import-b\">informal power<\/strong><\/span> unique to their own circumstances and personality. Informal powers are those that are not outlined in the constitution or statutes but exercised by the individual in office\u2014meaning, of course, that these can vary widely across administrations. Examples of informal power can include unique personal background or circumstances, charisma or personality, and outreach.<\/p>\r\n<p class=\"import-p\" style=\"text-indent: 36pt;\">Though many candidates who seek the governorship have some prior political experience, they often have other life experiences that may help them separate themselves from their opponents. Politics tends to be dominated by lawyers, and mastery and understanding of the law are certainly helpful in holding public office, especially in a role that is responsible for the law\u2019s implementation.<sup class=\"import-enref\">[footnote]Carsey, Campaign Dynamics.[\/footnote]<\/sup> Every experience can lend itself to public service, despite the initial obvious relevance. Jesse \u201cThe Body\u201d Ventura was a wrestler before he successfully ran to serve as governor of Minnesota; Arnold Schwarzenegger likewise had a storied career in film and bodybuilding before voters selected him to serve as their governor in California. Both men understood the importance of performance and connecting with an audience, two qualities that are useful in politics.<\/p>\r\n<p class=\"import-p\" style=\"text-indent: 36pt;\">Increasingly, we have seen more candidates from other professional backgrounds run for governor, even newcomers to politics who have not held an elected office before declaring their gubernatorial candidacy. This will be discussed in more detail later in the book (<span style=\"border: none windowtext 0pt; padding: 0;\"><span class=\"import-xref\">Chapter 9<\/span><\/span>). Many governors have presidential aspirations as well, using the highest executive office at the state level as a platform to run for the highest executive office at the federal level. One advantage these candidates have is their experience with unilateral executive skills and collaboration with legislative branches through their role as governor.<sup class=\"import-enref\">[footnote]Silver, \u201cGovernors\u2019 Advantage.\u201d[\/footnote]<\/sup> Governors from larger states or those who are well known on their own accord tend to be more successful as well.<\/p>\r\n<p class=\"import-p\" style=\"text-indent: 36pt;\">Some governors are notably charismatic, well regarded in public speaking, or especially personable. These characteristics are all widely subjective among voters, but aligned with the right circumstances (partisanship of the electorate, resonance of salient issues, mobilization of support, etc.), they can aid a governor in their efforts.<sup class=\"import-enref\">[footnote]Jensen et al., \u201cCombating COVID-19,\u201d 101702; Barth and Ferguson, \u201cAmerican Governors,\u201d 268\u2013282; Carsey et al., \u201cStrategic Candidates,\u201d 269\u2013298.[\/footnote]<\/sup> An eloquent governor can harness their outstanding speaking skills to convince lawmakers to revisit their issue or address the public in a press conference to convey a particular message. Being able to effectively reach out or connect with voters is essential for any successful candidate, but governors who display an unusual ability to really resonate with their supporters can likewise leverage that relationship and translate it into policy support. Even if a governor is faced with an antagonistic legislature, public appeals to supporters, who can then put pressure on their representative, can be an effective outsider strategy.<\/p>\r\n<p class=\"import-p\" style=\"text-indent: 36pt;\">The governor is also the de facto chief of the party. Though the statewide political parties have organizations with actual party chairs, those individuals are typically only known widely to party insiders. They fulfill important administrative functions, but the governor serves in a more pronounced and visible role, so the office serves as a de facto name and face of the party as its most prominent statewide officeholder.<sup class=\"import-enref\">[footnote]Morehouse, Governor as Party Leader.[\/footnote]<\/sup><\/p>\r\n<p class=\"import-p\" style=\"text-indent: 36pt;\">The informal powers come with the person, not the office, so they change as often as the occupant of the position does. Learning how to productively utilize them, though, can prove to be an incredible advantage for a governor, working in other branches like the legislature but also with other offices in their own executive branch too.<\/p>\r\n\r\n<h1 class=\"import-ah\">What Are Positions in the Executive Branch?<\/h1>\r\n<p class=\"import-paft\">The governor does represent the head of the executive branch and is also seen as the de facto leader of the state as the political figure most recognized and associated with the state they represent. The executive branch, however, comprises many different positions, both elected and appointed (and even those that are hired as part of the bureaucracy). Some of these positions, such as the heads of agencies and departments within the executive branch, are appointed by the governor and thus report and respond to the person in that office. Many of the high-level statewide executive offices, though, are not necessarily appointed. As is true for many features of state government, the selection method and the actual offices and responsibilities associated with them do vary across the states. To better understand what these other executive positions are, we will review the most common statewide executive offices and explore their primary functions and how they are selected. When possible, details about the office are included to illustrate the wide range of diversity in how state executive branches are organized and operate.<\/p>\r\n\r\n<h2 class=\"import-bh\">Lieutenant Governor<\/h2>\r\n<p class=\"import-paft\">The <span style=\"border: none windowtext 0pt; padding: 0;\"><strong class=\"import-b\">lieutenant governor<\/strong><\/span> role is sometimes viewed as the state-level equivalent of the vice presidency from the national government. Indeed, some parallels exist, making this precursory comparison understandable. Some states elect their governors \/ lieutenant governors on the same ticket, as we do for the president \/ vice president; some states imbue a culture where the lieutenant governor is often seen as the next in line for the governorship broadly (and next in line legally in the unfortunate case of a succession plan in action); and finally, some state constitutions provide relatively little unilateral power to the lieutenant governor role, so their primary responsibility is to help campaign for and support the issues important to the governor.<sup class=\"import-enref\">[footnote]Briffault, \u201cSkelos v. Paterson,\u201d 675.[\/footnote]<\/sup><\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n[caption id=\"attachment_193\" align=\"alignright\" width=\"500\"]<img class=\"wp-image-193\" src=\"http:\/\/pressbooks.palni.org\/theexcitingdynamicsofstateandlocalgovernment\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/79\/2025\/06\/5.2.jpg\" alt=\"Lieutenant Governor Albert Brewer takes the oath of office in 1968.\" width=\"500\" height=\"356\" \/> <strong><span class=\"import-fighn\">Figure 5.2 - <\/span>Alabama Lieutenant Governor Albert Brewer Sworn in as Governor upon the Death of Incumbent Governor Lurleen Wallace in 1968<br \/>Source: \"<a href=\"https:\/\/commons.wikimedia.org\/wiki\/File:Albert_Brewer_oath_of_office.jpg\"><span class=\"mw-page-title-main\">Albert Brewer oath of office\"<\/span><\/a> by the Brewer for Governor Committee on Wikimedia Commons \/ <a href=\"https:\/\/creativecommons.org\/public-domain\/pdm\/\">Public Domain.<\/a><\/strong>[\/caption]\r\n<p class=\"import-p\" style=\"text-indent: 36pt;\">Assuming the lieutenant governor and the vice president were essentially the same role would be an oversimplification that ignores some of the unique characteristics of the position of lieutenant governor. First, not all states actually have this office. Forty-five out of fifty states do utilize a lieutenant governor; only Georgia, Tennessee, Texas, and West Virginia do not.<sup class=\"import-enref\">[footnote]Some states have recently added the role of a lieutenant governor, but it was not originally in their state constitution. Arizona voters approved this new post in 2022 to go into effect in 2026, while New Jersey created the position in 2005 with the first lieutenant governor elected in 2010.[\/footnote]<\/sup> The amount of power and actual constitutional responsibility of the office still varies among the forty-five states that do have it.<sup class=\"import-enref\">[footnote]Freedman and Thai, \u201cLittle Newspaper Coverage,\u201d 82\u2013100.[\/footnote]<\/sup> In a legal capacity, the lieutenant governor is the state\u2019s next-highest officer and does follow the governor in the line of succession if the unfortunate moment arises. However, in less tragic circumstances, they represent the governor and stand in when the governor simply can\u2019t, whether it is to welcome visitors at a state convention or to tour a factory that would benefit from the governor\u2019s economic policy proposal.<sup class=\"import-enref\">[footnote]Winder and Hill, \u201cGovernor and the Lieutenant Governor,\u201d 634\u2013656.[\/footnote]<\/sup><\/p>\r\n<p class=\"import-p\" style=\"text-indent: 36pt;\">Like the vice president role at the federal level, lieutenant governors may also serve as the presiding leader over the upper chamber of the state assembly (typically known as the state senate). At the federal level, the vice president provides this role to the US Senate. Generally, the lieutenant governor has the authority to preside, break ties in votes when needed, and conduct some manner of business in the chamber. The roles of the Senate president pro tempore and majority and minority leaders are also essential in conducting legislative business (discussed in <span style=\"border: none windowtext 0pt; padding: 0;\"><span class=\"import-xref\">Chapter 4<\/span><\/span>).<\/p>\r\n<p class=\"import-p\" style=\"text-indent: 36pt;\">While they do share succession and senate powers, lieutenant governors differ from their federal counterparts in their relationship to the governor. As noted earlier, not all run on the same ticket as the governor. Seventeen states elect their lieutenant governor separately from their governor. This provides the lieutenant governor role with more power and authority to act separately from the governor, perhaps even coming from a different political party, making their relationship even more interesting.<sup class=\"import-enref\">[footnote]Briffault, \u201cSkelos v. Paterson,\u201d 675.[\/footnote]<\/sup> This can become especially complicated when the governor may leave the state for a certain period and the de facto actor in their absence is a lieutenant governor who may share a very different perspective from the governor and now has an opportunity to act on that view with executive power. These \u201cdivided executives\u201d mean rivalries can run rampant and deep within the executive branch. It also dilutes the governor\u2019s power and influence over their next-in-line colleague.<\/p>\r\n<p class=\"import-p\" style=\"text-indent: 36pt;\">Some states give lieutenant governors broad policy power, convenient considering their role as the senate president.<sup class=\"import-enref\">[footnote]Lynch, \u201cProblem with the Lieutenant Governor,\u201d 87.[\/footnote]<\/sup> They cannot singly author legislation, but they can identify advocates in the legislature to do that with them, and then lieutenant governors can employ their platform to rally support, both externally with the public and internally within the legislative branch, to pass the policy into law.<sup class=\"import-enref\">[footnote]Winder and Hill, \u201cGovernor and the Lieutenant Governor,\u201d 634\u2013656.[\/footnote]<\/sup> For states that do not have a secretary of state role, the lieutenant governor may also have the authority to oversee election administration, which is a large and important undertaking.<\/p>\r\n\r\n<h2 class=\"import-bh\">Attorney General<\/h2>\r\n<p class=\"import-paft\">Just as the post of lieutenant governor is held in the executive branch but integrally involved in the legislative branch through the state senate, the <span style=\"border: none windowtext 0pt; padding: 0;\"><strong class=\"import-b\">attorney general<\/strong><\/span> role straddles both the executive and judicial branches through its power.<sup class=\"import-enref\">[footnote]Marshall, \u201cBreak Up the Presidency,\u201d 2446.[\/footnote]<\/sup> The attorney general is the chief legal counsel for the state and is responsible for representing the state in lawsuits. They advise the state government in legal matters and lead the enforcement of state laws. This is in addition to upholding federal laws as well, since the attorney general is sworn to uphold the constitution of both levels of government and thus holds responsibility for the enforcement of both.<\/p>\r\n<p class=\"import-p\" style=\"text-indent: 36pt;\">The position of attorney general is viewed as so vital to the policy process that all fifty states have it as part of their executive branch.<sup class=\"import-enref\">[footnote]Matheson, \u201cConstitutional Status and Role,\u201d 1.[\/footnote]<\/sup> In most states, the role is selected through popular elections, like the governor\u2019s office. Only seven states do not offer elections for the attorney general; in those states, the position is determined by gubernatorial appointment (Alaska, Hawaii, New Hampshire, New Jersey, and Wyoming), judicial appointment (Tennessee), or legislative election (Maine).<\/p>\r\n<p class=\"import-p\" style=\"text-indent: 36pt;\">Because of their leadership in law enforcement and representation of the state in lawsuits, the attorney general role is often viewed as very powerful, sometimes usurping the attention from and upstaging the lieutenant governor\u2019s role, particularly in the states where that position has relatively little unilateral authority.<sup class=\"import-enref\">[footnote]Citron, \u201cPrivacy Policymaking,\u201d 747; Marshall, \u201cBreak Up the Presidency,\u201d 2446.[\/footnote]<\/sup> Depending on the state, the office of attorney general also can be in charge of the state\u2019s department of justice. To continue with the comparisons of federal offices, this would be equivalent to the relationship of the attorney general of the United States and their relationship with the US Department of Justice. Attorneys general serve as both political and legal actors and, as such, can use important and interesting lawsuits to leverage their own position in the public eye.<sup class=\"import-enref\">[footnote]Miller, \u201cState Attorneys General,\u201d 1.[\/footnote]<\/sup><\/p>\r\n<p class=\"import-p\" style=\"text-indent: 36pt;\">It is important to note that the power of the attorney general\u2019s office can also be impacted by their own term and tenure power (much as we will see with the governor later in this chapter, in <span style=\"border: none windowtext 0pt; padding: 0;\"><span class=\"import-xref\">\u201cWhat Are Legislative and Executive Gubernatorial Powers?\u201d<\/span><\/span>).<sup class=\"import-enref\">[footnote]Earley, \u201cSpecial Solicitude,\u201d 561.[\/footnote]<\/sup> Most states employ a four-year term, which mimics similar gubernatorial standards. Yet there is significant variation in other states between shorter terms (such as in Maine, which limits the attorney general to a two-year term) and longer ones (as we see in Tennessee with an eight-year term). Term length serves as a sort of deadline for occupants of the office, though only term limits and removal cease an incumbents\u2019 service.<\/p>\r\n\r\n<h2 class=\"import-bh\">Secretary of State<\/h2>\r\n<p class=\"import-paft\">The <span style=\"border: none windowtext 0pt; padding: 0;\"><strong class=\"import-b\">secretary of state<\/strong><\/span> role, much like that of the attorney general, is viewed as one of the more powerful posts in the executive branch. It has garnered significantly more attention in the last several election cycles compared to its more innocuous public perception in earlier history; this can be attributed to the increasing debates over voter enfranchisement, security, fraud, and other claims that are reflected in the policies the office implements. Elections serve as an exciting example of shared powers of federalism in action, and the debates play out in policies such as the availability of early or absentee voting, the process of ballot access, the timing of voter registration, and the IDs needed (or not) to cast a ballot.<sup class=\"import-enref\">[footnote]Montjoy, \u201cPublic Administration of Elections,\u201d 788\u2013799; Priest, \u201cSecretaries Speak,\u201d 71\u201374.[\/footnote]<\/sup><\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n[caption id=\"attachment_215\" align=\"alignleft\" width=\"225\"]<img class=\"wp-image-215 size-medium\" src=\"http:\/\/pressbooks.palni.org\/theexcitingdynamicsofstateandlocalgovernment\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/79\/2025\/05\/5.3-new-225x300.jpg\" alt=\"Hon. Brad Raffensperger \" width=\"225\" height=\"300\" \/> <strong>Figure 5.3 - Georgia Secretary of State Brad Raffensperger, Embroiled in the 2020 Presidential Election, 2022<br \/>Source: \"<span class=\"mw-page-title-main\"><a href=\"https:\/\/flickr.com\/photos\/9133668@N08\/52531507771\">Brad Raffensperger 2022<\/a>\" by <\/span><span style=\"orphans: 1; text-align: initial; font-size: 1em;\">Knight Foundation on Flickr\/ <a href=\"https:\/\/creativecommons.org\/licenses\/by-sa\/2.0\/deed.en\">CC BY-SA.<\/a><\/span><\/strong>[\/caption]\r\n<p class=\"import-p\" style=\"text-indent: 36pt;\">Because of this important role, most state constitutions do have a secretary of state office, with only three that do not. In Alaska, Hawaii, and Utah, the responsibilities typically designated to the secretary of state are instead assigned to the lieutenant governor, making that office a little bit more powerful than in the states that have a secretary of state. Inversely, in the three states that do not have a lieutenant governor, the office of the secretary of state is placed first in line in the order of succession. Additionally, three other states (Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, and Virginia) employ a \u201csecretary of the commonwealth,\u201d which is the constitutional equivalent of the secretary of state.<\/p>\r\n<p class=\"import-p\" style=\"text-indent: 36pt;\">At the federal level, the secretary of state is often seen as a leader in diplomacy and international relations. At the state level, this is a great example of where an office might share the same name but is clearly different with regard to responsibilities. The secretary of state is in charge of elections, oftentimes serving as the chief election officer for the state. They are also responsible for overseeing businesses in the state, usually responsible for administering the Uniform Commercial Code. This extensive set of codes is a national standard that is used almost in its entirety by all the states as a way to universalize business transactions across states to make conducting business easier and more efficient. Finally, the office can also be responsible for notaries of the public and recordkeeping for official state records (both those of government, like executive orders, and also those for citizens, like marriage certificates).<\/p>\r\n\r\n<h2 class=\"import-bh\">Auditor<\/h2>\r\n<p class=\"import-paft\"><span style=\"border: none windowtext 0pt; padding: 0;\"><strong class=\"import-b\">State auditors<\/strong><\/span> provide an essential fiduciary function in state government, particularly valuable in the twenty-first century as states\u2019 roles, involvement, and budgets expand. They serve as auditors of state funds, which do not belong to them or their office but rather are the funds of and for the taxpayers.<sup class=\"import-enref\">[footnote]Council of State Governments, Book of the States.\u201cBook of the States, Volume 53.\u201d[\/footnote]<\/sup> This fiduciary responsibility is important, and auditors ensure that those funds are being spent appropriately and in accordance with the law.<\/p>\r\n<p class=\"import-p\" style=\"text-indent: 36pt;\">Most broadly, the auditor\u2019s job is to examine accounts and identify and eliminate issues.<sup class=\"import-enref\">[footnote]Schwartz, \u201cCoping with the Effectiveness Dilemma,\u201d 511\u2013526.[\/footnote]<\/sup> Sometimes, these can be malicious, such as abuse or fraud; other times, ill intent may not be at play, but issues involving waste and redundancies are also undesirable, and under their fiduciary responsibility to the public, the auditors also work to detect these problems. Some of the processes auditors use to find issues and address them include auditing public financial statements, verifying compliance with regulations, and evaluating the performance and processes of programs. There are also independent external auditors who provide a similar function to ensure the legitimacy and accountability of the auditors, but these positions are privately operated, and they are not public officials in the executive branch.<\/p>\r\n<p class=\"import-p\" style=\"text-indent: 36pt;\">The auditor is selected through either popular election, legislative appointment, or gubernatorial appointment. In cases in which the governor does get to select the auditor, the appointment process still involves the state legislature in either the initial nomination or subsequent confirmation. The role of the auditor requires specific professional training, making it more similar to the attorney general and less like the secretary of state or lieutenant governor.<sup class=\"import-enref\">[footnote]Schelker, \u201cPublic Auditors.\u201d[\/footnote]<\/sup> There is also a keen interest in neutrality, a feature important in any elected office, but that does not mean they are necessarily apolitical.<sup class=\"import-enref\">[footnote]Hornbeck and Malin, \u201cState Auditors,\u201d 1047\u20131075.[\/footnote]<\/sup> Neutrality is particularly valuable for the auditor because of the office\u2019s vested fiduciary responsibility.<\/p>\r\n<p class=\"import-p\" style=\"text-indent: 36pt;\">It is important to note here that some states also have a separate office known as the comptroller, discussed in the next section. In the states that do not have a comptroller, those responsibilities fall under the purview of the auditor\u2019s office.<\/p>\r\n\r\n<h2 class=\"import-bh\">Comptroller<\/h2>\r\n<p class=\"import-paft\">The office of the <span style=\"border: none windowtext 0pt; padding: 0;\"><strong class=\"import-b\">comptroller<\/strong><\/span> may be one that is less recognizable to readers, in part because it is less utilized in state governments. Only nine states presently use a separately elected comptroller, and they tend to be larger states with greater populations, more professionalized state legislatures, and larger state budgets accompanied by greater state services. The states that have a comptroller (or controller, as the office is referred to in California) include California, Connecticut, Florida, Illinois, Maryland, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, and Texas.<sup class=\"import-enref\">[footnote]Bentley, \u201cNew York State Comptroller,\u201d 761.[\/footnote]<\/sup><\/p>\r\n<p class=\"import-p\" style=\"text-indent: 36pt;\">The comptroller generally serves a preaudit for expenditures from the state legislature, a particularly important and arduous task for those states with larger budgets, services, and legislative actions.<sup class=\"import-enref\">[footnote]Hevesi, \u201cStandards for Internal Control.\u201d[\/footnote]<\/sup> As noted, the auditor reviews receipts after the funds have been spent to ensure they have been spent in accordance with the law and statutes. The comptroller provides a similar oversight before the disbursement of funds. In a small state, there might be less demand for tasks, or they could be subsumed into the auditor\u2019s own office. For a large state with much more money and tasks at stake, requiring a preaudit before expenditures occur can ensure funds are not mismanaged and costly errors are caught before they are incurred.<\/p>\r\n\r\n<h2 class=\"import-bh\">Treasurer<\/h2>\r\n<p class=\"import-paft\">State <span style=\"border: none windowtext 0pt; padding: 0;\"><strong class=\"import-b\">treasurers<\/strong><\/span> are the chief custodians of the state government, dealing directly with the funds both coming in and going out. They are sometimes also referred to as the state\u2019s head bankers, though it is worth clarifying that they are still publicly elected officials.<sup class=\"import-enref\">[footnote]Bunch and Ferrara, \u201cFactors to Consider,\u201d 32\u201351.[\/footnote]<\/sup> Almost every state has a treasurer, with two notable exceptions. New York removed the office and transferred the treasurer\u2019s powers to the comptroller in 1926, and Texas did the same in 1996. In both these states, the comptroller thus holds more power and responsibility.<\/p>\r\n<p class=\"import-p\" style=\"text-indent: 36pt;\">As the chief money manager, the treasurer has authority over investments, budget surpluses and deficits, and funds received and deposited. Like the roles of auditor and comptroller, the treasurer\u2019s office has a fiduciary responsibility to the public to manage funds wisely. This is particularly relevant in terms of investments; while there is additional oversight and transparency in making and reviewing the investments, it is a major responsibility of the treasurer to ensure that these are made in line with the law and in a prudent manner. When money is owed to the state, most often in the form of taxes, it is paid to the treasurer, and likewise, when money is given from the state, it comes from the treasurer.<\/p>\r\n<p class=\"import-p\" style=\"text-indent: 36pt;\">Overseeing the state\u2019s budget surplus or deficit is a vital part of state treasury management.<sup class=\"import-enref\">[footnote]Rubin, \u201cState of State Budget Research,\u201d 46\u201367.[\/footnote]<\/sup> Not all states have balanced budget provisions in their constitutions, and several factors can influence the variation in budget predictability from year to year. For example, states that budget biannually (once every two years) save some time in the budgeting process from going through it annually but also may struggle with accurate modeling in predicting what revenue will come in and what expenditures will go out, relying on two-year-old data.<sup class=\"import-enref\">[footnote]Warnick, \u201cImpact of Shifting.\u201d[\/footnote]<\/sup> The governor and legislature are ultimately responsible for the budget, but it is up to the treasurer to keep track of the surplus or deficit incurred.<\/p>\r\n\r\n<h1 class=\"import-ah\">What Are Executive and Legislative Gubernatorial Powers?<\/h1>\r\n<p class=\"import-paft\">It is nearly impossible to discuss the powers of the executive branch without discussing its interactions with the other branches of government, especially the legislative branch. This is in part because the governor shares authority with the legislature in making laws, and the policymaking process cannot happen unilaterally without the involvement of both branches of government. Though the governor is an officer of the executive branch, they embody powers within both the legislative branch and the executive. These powers will be examined more here.<\/p>\r\n\r\n<h2 class=\"import-bh\">Executive Powers<\/h2>\r\n<p class=\"import-paft\">As the chief executive of the state, the governor holds some unilateral power and shared authority within the executive branch.<sup class=\"import-enref\">[footnote]Krause and Melusky, \u201cConcentrated Powers,\u201d 98\u2013112.[\/footnote]<\/sup> Many of the responsibilities of the governor are affected in some manner by the legislative branch, and these roles (passing legislation, passing the budget, and making appointments) are all described in the next section, <span style=\"border: none windowtext 0pt; padding: 0;\"><span class=\"import-xref\">\u201c<\/span><span class=\"import-xref\">Legislative Powers<\/span><span class=\"import-xref\">.\u201d<\/span><\/span> The governor, however, still manifests some unilateral powers that are exclusive to the office. The governor addresses the public on an annual basis in the state of the state speech, they have the power to issue executive orders and clemency, and depending on the constitutional limitations, they can potentially succeed themselves in office through reelection (in some cases, indefinitely).<\/p>\r\n<p class=\"import-p\" style=\"text-indent: 36pt;\">Delivering the state of the state address provides the governor with generally the largest platform for state politics to showcase their successes and highlight their agenda. Much like the \u201cgoing public\u201d approach to public exposure, the annual speech <span style=\"border: none windowtext 0pt; padding: 0;\"><em class=\"import-i\">can<\/em><\/span> serve as the vehicle through which governors can directly reach out to their constituents and garner their support for the issues prioritized for the next year.<sup class=\"import-enref\">[footnote]Kousser and Phillips, Power of American Governors, 171; Kernell, Going Public.[\/footnote]<\/sup> The impact of the address, however, should not be overstated. Not everyone will tune in to watch, and the audience is much smaller than the State of the Union for obvious and expected reasons. Viewers are more likely to already be paying attention to politics and following along with the major issues at stake.<sup class=\"import-enref\">[footnote]Wolak and Parinandi, \u201cDoes the Public Hold Governors Accountable?,\u201d 1051\u20131064.[\/footnote]<\/sup> This address does give the governor a unique opportunity to formally speak to all the institutions of state government (with the legislature and key leadership from the judicial branch present) and to connect directly with the public that does care enough to tune in and watch.<\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n[caption id=\"attachment_192\" align=\"alignright\" width=\"500\"]<img class=\"wp-image-192\" src=\"http:\/\/pressbooks.palni.org\/theexcitingdynamicsofstateandlocalgovernment\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/79\/2025\/06\/5.3.jpg\" alt=\"Governor Andrew Cuomo speaks at a podium in a New York City subway.\" width=\"500\" height=\"368\" \/> <strong>Figure 5.4 - New York Governor Andrew Cuomo Fields Questions from the Press, 2016<br \/>Source: \"<a href=\"https:\/\/flickr.com\/photos\/61135621@N03\/23887515479\">Governor Cuomo's Major Agenda Proposal<\/a>\" by Metropolitan Transportation Authority on Flickr \/ <a href=\"https:\/\/creativecommons.org\/licenses\/by\/2.0\/deed.en\">CC BY<\/a>.<\/strong>[\/caption]\r\n<p class=\"import-p\" style=\"text-indent: 36pt;\">The governor also holds the authority to issue <span style=\"border: none windowtext 0pt; padding: 0;\"><strong class=\"import-b\">executive orders<\/strong><\/span>\u2014an executive mandate that can sidestep the legislature and policymaking process when necessary. These orders are probably most often recognized when issued to respond to a crisis, whether it is a public health emergency like COVID-19 or a natural disaster.<sup class=\"import-enref\">[footnote]Gakh et al., \u201cGovernors\u2019 Use of Executive Orders,\u201d 489\u2013495; Weissert et al., \u201cGovernors in Control,\u201d 396\u2013428.[\/footnote]<\/sup> In these cases, the executive order may be a necessary first step to triggering the release of funds or emergency powers granted exclusively during such times of crisis. Less notable but still important, executive orders may be issued to create agencies, boards, or commissions within the executive branch.<sup class=\"import-enref\">[footnote]Cockerham and Crew, \u201cFactors Affecting Governors\u2019 Decisions,\u201d 6\u201314.[\/footnote]<\/sup><\/p>\r\n<p class=\"import-p\" style=\"text-indent: 36pt;\">In addition, governors have the ability to offer <span style=\"border: none windowtext 0pt; padding: 0;\"><strong class=\"import-b\">clemency<\/strong><\/span> for a crime. This may be through nullifying the consequences (a pardon), commuting a sentence, or issuing a reprieve or injunction on a sentence.<sup class=\"import-enref\">[footnote]Ridolfi and Gordon, \u201cGubernatorial Clemency Powers,\u201d 26; Drinan, \u201cClemency in a Time of Crisis,\u201d 1123; Harris and Redmond, \u201cExecutive Clemency,\u201d 2.[\/footnote]<\/sup> The process and power for each of these differs from state to state.<\/p>\r\n<p class=\"import-p\" style=\"text-indent: 36pt;\"><span style=\"border: none windowtext 0pt; padding: 0;\"><strong class=\"import-b\">Tenure power<\/strong><\/span> includes both the lengths of terms and the ability to succeed oneself in office, serving as an institutional mechanism that enables the governor to expand their reach when few limits and broad authority to these powers exist. A governor has significant tenure power, for example, if they have longer terms and no term limits placed on their service. A governor who is limited to shorter terms and has tight term limits would have less tenure power. This has expanded in most states throughout history, particularly during the reforms to strengthen executive power.<sup class=\"import-enref\">[footnote]Tarr, Understanding State Constitutions.[\/footnote]<\/sup> Terms for governors in most states are four years (like the terms for the federal chief executive), but New Hampshire and Vermont have two-year terms.<sup class=\"import-enref\">[footnote]National Governors Association, \u201cGovernors: Powers and Authority.\u201d[\/footnote]<\/sup> Only Virginia prohibits a governor from self-succession, though historically, many of the Southern states had similar limits, reducing the power of governors and making two-term executives (with at least one different governor\u2019s term of service in between) quite challenging and uncommon. The limits on terms vary. Thirty-seven states utilize term limits on their executives, with the most common limit reflecting the national model of a two-term (eight-year total) limit.<sup class=\"import-enref\">[footnote]Smart and Sturm, \u201cTerm Limits and Electoral Accountability,\u201d 93\u2013102.[\/footnote]<\/sup> Some states include \u201cpauses\u201d for one term (Indiana, Wyoming, and Oregon) or two (Montana) to separate between their two consecutive four-year term limits. Proponents of these barriers argue that they allow for more competition and pressure governors to prioritize their agenda within the deadline of their own term limit.<sup class=\"import-enref\">[footnote]Smart and Sturm, \u201cTerm Limits and Electoral Accountability,\u201d 93\u2013102; Klarin, Term Length.[\/footnote]<\/sup> Opposition arguments view these as artificial blocks that prevent voters from being able to reelect a candidate if they so choose.<sup class=\"import-enref\">[footnote]Elhauge, \u201cAre Term Limits Undemocratic?,\u201d 83\u2013201; Ferguson, \u201cGovernors and the Executive Branch,\u201d 208\u2013250.[\/footnote]<\/sup><\/p>\r\n\r\n<h2 class=\"import-bh\">Legislative Powers<\/h2>\r\n<p class=\"import-paft\">Depending on the organization of the executive branch, governors may have relatively limited unilateral powers. Indeed, most of the powers we often associate with governors have shared elements with the legislature. The governor works with the legislature on budgets and legislation and also in terms of filling appointments. Because of this, the governor has legislative power despite serving as the head of the executive branch.<\/p>\r\n<p class=\"import-p\" style=\"text-indent: 36pt;\">The budgetary process incorporates both legislative and executive branches of government because of the magnitude of the responsibility and the value of the input both branches can provide. The legislature writes bills that may have appropriations attached and will thus know how much they intend to spend and what legislative responsibilities they are prioritizing. The governor is looking through a statewide lens, though, so they will see items related to the bureaucracy (including the agencies, departments, and commissions) and the needs of the full state that may not be as visible to the legislators. The governor proposes the budget, but both chambers of the legislature must pass it, making it an essential responsibility of both branches.<sup class=\"import-enref\">[footnote]Kousser and Phillips, Power of American Governors.[\/footnote]<\/sup><\/p>\r\n<p class=\"import-p\" style=\"text-indent: 36pt;\">The governor serves a similar role in the passing of statewide legislation. Though only a member of the state legislature can draft a bill, the governor has legislative liaisons working closely with and following the efforts of the legislature. If the governor has a strong working relationship and positive reputation with the legislature, they may be effective at convincing legislators to adjust bills to the governor\u2019s preference before the proposed legislation leaves committee, virtually ensuring the governor will proudly sign when it comes to their desk. Governors who do not enjoy such a bond with their lawmaking counterparts may struggle to exert meaningful influence and instead may have to utilize their right to veto legislation that they disapprove of.<\/p>\r\n<p class=\"import-p\" style=\"text-indent: 36pt;\">These vetoes can take the form of <span style=\"border: none windowtext 0pt; padding: 0;\"><strong class=\"import-b\">line-item vetoes<\/strong><\/span> (striking down specific provisions) or <span style=\"border: none windowtext 0pt; padding: 0;\"><strong class=\"import-b\">pocket vetoes<\/strong><\/span> (intentionally failing to sign a bill into law within a certain period of time before the legislature adjourns).<sup class=\"import-enref\">[footnote]Carter and Schap, \u201cLine-Item Veto,\u201d 103\u2013118; Lauth, \u201cOther Six,\u201d 26\u201349; McCormack and Reingewertz, \u201cPolitics, Partisanship,\u201d 3546\u20133559.[\/footnote]<\/sup> Often the threat of a veto can be powerful enough, but depending on the partisan and ideological composition of the branches and even the personalities or approaches of the elected officials within them, the legislature can always override the governor\u2019s veto with a supermajority of support.<sup class=\"import-enref\">[footnote]McGrath, Rogowski, and Ryan et al., \u201cGubernatorial Veto Powers,\u201d 571\u2013598.[\/footnote]<\/sup><\/p>\r\n<p class=\"import-p\" style=\"text-indent: 36pt;\"><span style=\"border: none windowtext 0pt; padding: 0;\"><strong class=\"import-b\">Appointments<\/strong><\/span> illustrate another facet in which governors are subject to legislative approval, at either the beginning or the end of the appointment process. Some appointments begin with legislative recommendations, where the legislature brings the governor a short list of potential candidates and the governor makes their selections from there. Inversely, another process for appointments gives the governor the authority upfront to make the appointment and then the legislators the power on the back end to either confirm or deny.<\/p>\r\n<p class=\"import-p\" style=\"text-indent: 36pt;\">These appointments can be wide ranging, from the chief justice for the state supreme court to a small board position on a relatively obscure state commission with relatively limited power and scope. Because of the expansive responsibilities of state government and the modern bureaucratic framework, a governor can have hundreds of potential appointments to fill annually. Many factors can influence whether the process is efficient and effective; it is worth noting, though, that relative to the periodic controversial national appointment that depicts the president at odds with the Senate, most gubernatorial appointments and legislative confirmations are fairly straightforward and subdued.<\/p>\r\n\r\n<h1 class=\"import-ah\">Conclusion<\/h1>\r\n<p class=\"import-paft\">The executive branch hosts a number of essential offices, including the chief executive, that all share the same objective: to help implement and enforce the laws of the state government. The governor exercises formal powers of office that are outlined in the state constitution and state statutes, including those shared with the legislature, like appointments, passing legislation, and approving budgets. Governors also have informal powers that they bring to the office based on their own personalities, unique backgrounds leading to public service, approaches, or other characteristics that separate them from other elected officials and make them notable to their constituents.<\/p>\r\n<p class=\"import-p\" style=\"text-indent: 36pt;\">Most of the power in the executive branch, however, is divided and delegated among several offices or branches. Matters of financial responsibility belong to the auditor, treasurer, and\/or comptroller. Issues involving business and election operations fall under the purview of the secretary of state. Legal representation and action belong to the attorneys general. Governors who run on the same ticket as their lieutenant governors might expect that their constitutional subordinates help promote the gubernatorial agenda, but some states allocate more authority and power for this office to exercise.<\/p>\r\n<p class=\"import-p\" style=\"text-indent: 36pt;\">The greatest limitations of the executive branch, however, lie in its shared and fractured powers. Authority is shared with the legislature on many issues so that the unilateral powers of governors seem limited in comparison. Governors, however, have the authority to issue executive orders, propose a budget, make appointments, and veto legislation, which cumulatively gives the office substantial power.<\/p>\r\n\r\n<div class=\"textbox textbox--key-takeaways\"><header class=\"textbox__header\">\r\n<p class=\"textbox__title\">Bibliography<\/p>\r\n\r\n<\/header>\r\n<div class=\"textbox__content\">\r\n<p class=\"hanging-indent\">Abney, Glenn, and Thomas P. Lauth. \u201cThe Governor as Chief Administrator.\u201d <span style=\"border: none windowtext 0pt; padding: 0;\"><em class=\"import-i\">Public Administration Review<\/em><\/span> 43, no. 1 (1983): 40\u201349.<\/p>\r\n<p class=\"hanging-indent\">Barth, Jay, and Margaret R. Ferguson. \u201cAmerican Governors and Their Constituents: The Relationship Between Gubernatorial Personality and Public Approval.\u201d <span style=\"border: none windowtext 0pt; padding: 0;\"><em class=\"import-i\">State Politics &amp; Policy Quarterly<\/em><\/span> 2, no. 3 (2002): 268\u2013282.<\/p>\r\n<p class=\"hanging-indent\">Bentley, Andria L. \u201cThe New York State Comptroller as Sole Trustee of the Common Retirement Fund: A Constitutional Guarantee.\u201d <span style=\"border: none windowtext 0pt; padding: 0;\"><em class=\"import-i\">Albany Law Review<\/em><\/span> 72 (2009): 761.<\/p>\r\n<p class=\"hanging-indent\">Briffault, Richard. \u201cSkelos v. Paterson: The Surprisingly Strong Case for the Governor\u2019s Surprising Power to Appoint a Lieutenant Governor.\u201d <span style=\"border: none windowtext 0pt; padding: 0;\"><em class=\"import-i\">Albany Law Review<\/em><\/span> 73 (2009): 675.<\/p>\r\n<p class=\"hanging-indent\">Bunch, Beverly S., and Barbara E. Ferrara. \u201cFactors to Consider When Analyzing the Need for an Elected State Treasurer.\u201d <span style=\"border: none windowtext 0pt; padding: 0;\"><em class=\"import-i\">Public Budgeting &amp; Finance<\/em><\/span> 38, no. 4 (2018): 32\u201351.<\/p>\r\n<p class=\"hanging-indent\">Carsey, Thomas M. <span style=\"border: none windowtext 0pt; padding: 0;\"><em class=\"import-i\">Campaign Dynamics: The Race for Governor<\/em><\/span>. University of Michigan Press, 2009.<\/p>\r\n<p class=\"hanging-indent\">Carsey, Thomas M., Robert A. Jackson, Melissa Stewart, and James P. Nelson. \u201cStrategic Candidates, Campaign Dynamics, and Campaign Advertising in Gubernatorial Races.\u201d <span style=\"border: none windowtext 0pt; padding: 0;\"><em class=\"import-i\">State Politics &amp; Policy Quarterly<\/em><\/span> 11, no. 3 (2011): 269\u2013298.<\/p>\r\n<p class=\"hanging-indent\">Carter, John R., and David Schap. \u201cLine-Item Veto: Where Is Thy Sting?\u201d <span style=\"border: none windowtext 0pt; padding: 0;\"><em class=\"import-i\">Journal of Economic Perspectives<\/em><\/span> 4, no. 2 (1990): 103\u2013118.<\/p>\r\n<p class=\"hanging-indent\">Citron, Danielle Keats. \u201cThe Privacy Policymaking of State Attorneys General.\u201d <span style=\"border: none windowtext 0pt; padding: 0;\"><em class=\"import-i\">Notre Dame Law Review<\/em><\/span> 92 (2016): 747.<\/p>\r\n<p class=\"hanging-indent\">Cockerham, Alexandra G., and Robert E. Crew Jr. \u201cFactors Affecting Governors\u2019 Decisions to Issue Executive Orders.\u201d <span style=\"border: none windowtext 0pt; padding: 0;\"><em class=\"import-i\">State and Local Government Review<\/em><\/span> 49, no. 1 (2017): 6\u201314.<\/p>\r\n<p class=\"hanging-indent\">Council of State Governments. <span style=\"border: none windowtext 0pt; padding: 0;\"><em class=\"import-i\">The Book of the States, Volume 53<\/em><\/span>. 2021. Accessed March 14, 2022. <a href=\"https:\/\/www.nga.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2022\/10\/CSG-book-of-the-states-2021.pdf\"><span style=\"border: none windowtext 0pt; padding: 0;\"><span class=\"import-url\">https:\/\/www.nga.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2022\/10\/CSG-book-of-the-states-2021.pdf<\/span><\/span><\/a>.<\/p>\r\n<p class=\"hanging-indent\">Dinan, John J. <span style=\"border: none windowtext 0pt; padding: 0;\"><em class=\"import-i\">The American State Constitutional Tradition<\/em><\/span>. University Press of Kansas, 2006.<\/p>\r\n<p class=\"hanging-indent\">Drinan, Cara H. \u201cClemency in a Time of Crisis.\u201d <span style=\"border: none windowtext 0pt; padding: 0;\"><em class=\"import-i\">Georgia State University Law Review<\/em><\/span> 28 (2011): 1123.<\/p>\r\n<p class=\"hanging-indent\">Earley, Mark L. \u201cSpecial Solicitude: The Growing Power of State Attorneys General.\u201d <span style=\"border: none windowtext 0pt; padding: 0;\"><em class=\"import-i\">University of Richmond Law Review<\/em><\/span> 52 (2017): 561.<\/p>\r\n<p class=\"hanging-indent\">Elhauge, Einer. \u201cAre Term Limits Undemocratic?\u201d <span style=\"border: none windowtext 0pt; padding: 0;\"><em class=\"import-i\">University of Chicago Law Review<\/em><\/span> 64, no. 1 (1997): 83\u2013201.<\/p>\r\n<p class=\"hanging-indent\">Ferguson, Margaret. \u201cGovernors and the Executive Branch.\u201d In <span style=\"border: none windowtext 0pt; padding: 0;\"><em class=\"import-i\">Politics in the American States: A Comparative Analysis<\/em><\/span>, edited by V. Gray, R. L. Hanson, and T. Kousser, 208\u2013250. Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2013.<\/p>\r\n<p class=\"hanging-indent\">Freedman, Eric, and Daniel Thai. \u201cLittle Newspaper Coverage for Lt. Governor Candidates.\u201d <span style=\"border: none windowtext 0pt; padding: 0;\"><em class=\"import-i\">Newspaper Research Journal<\/em><\/span> 27, no. 3 (2006): 82\u2013100.<\/p>\r\n<p class=\"hanging-indent\">Gakh, Maxim, Gregory Sunshine, Alexa Limeres, and Lainie Rutkow. \u201cGovernors\u2019 Use of Executive Orders and Proclamations in Hurricane Response, 2006\u20132018.\u201d <span style=\"border: none windowtext 0pt; padding: 0;\"><em class=\"import-i\">Health Security<\/em><\/span> 18, no. 6 (2020): 489\u2013495.<\/p>\r\n<p class=\"hanging-indent\">Hamman, John A. \u201cCareer Experience and Performing Effectively as Governor.\u201d <span style=\"border: none windowtext 0pt; padding: 0;\"><em class=\"import-i\">American Review of Public Administration<\/em><\/span> 34, no. 2 (2004): 151\u2013163.<\/p>\r\n<p class=\"hanging-indent\">Harris, Jonathan, and Lothlorien Redmond. \u201cExecutive Clemency: The Lethal Absence of Hope.\u201d <span style=\"border: none windowtext 0pt; padding: 0;\"><em class=\"import-i\">Criminal Law Brief<\/em><\/span> 3 (2007): 2.<\/p>\r\n<p class=\"hanging-indent\">Herzik, Eric B., and Charles W. Wiggins. \u201cGovernors vs. Legislatures: Vetoes, Overrides, and Policy Making in the American States.\u201d <span style=\"border: none windowtext 0pt; padding: 0;\"><em class=\"import-i\">Policy Studies Journal<\/em><\/span> 17, no. 4 (1989): 841.<\/p>\r\n<p class=\"hanging-indent\">Hevesi, G. Alan. \u201cStandards for Internal Control in New York State Government.\u201d 2005. <a href=\"https:\/\/ms.hmb.gov.tr\/uploads\/2019\/01\/intcontrol_stds.pdf\"><span style=\"border: none windowtext 0pt; padding: 0;\"><span class=\"import-url\">https:\/\/ms.hmb.gov.tr\/uploads\/2019\/01\/intcontrol_stds.pdf<\/span><\/span><\/a>.<\/p>\r\n<p class=\"hanging-indent\">Hornbeck, Dustin, and Joel Malin. \u201cState Auditors in Education Policy.\u201d <span style=\"border: none windowtext 0pt; padding: 0;\"><em class=\"import-i\">Educational Policy<\/em><\/span> 33, no. 7 (2019): 1047\u20131075.<\/p>\r\n<p class=\"hanging-indent\">Jensen, Ulrich Thy, Dominic Rohner, Olivier Bornet, et al. \u201cCombating COVID-19 with Charisma: Evidence on Governor Speeches in the United States.\u201d <span style=\"border: none windowtext 0pt; padding: 0;\"><em class=\"import-i\">Leadership Quarterly<\/em><\/span> 34, no. 6 (2023): 101702.<\/p>\r\n<p class=\"hanging-indent\">Kernell, Samuel. <span style=\"border: none windowtext 0pt; padding: 0;\"><em class=\"import-i\">Going Public: New Strategies <\/em><em class=\"import-i\">of<\/em><em class=\"import-i\"> Presidential Leadership<\/em><\/span>. CQ Press, 2006.<\/p>\r\n<p class=\"hanging-indent\">Klarin, Jonas. <span style=\"border: none windowtext 0pt; padding: 0;\"><em class=\"import-i\">Term Length and Public Finances: The Case of US Governors<\/em><\/span>. Uppsala University, 2019.<\/p>\r\n<p class=\"hanging-indent\">Kousser, Thad, and Justin H. Phillips. <span style=\"border: none windowtext 0pt; padding: 0;\"><em class=\"import-i\">The Power of American Governors: Winning on Budgets and Losing on Policy<\/em><\/span>. Cambridge University Press, 2012.<\/p>\r\n<p class=\"hanging-indent\">Krause, George A., and Benjamin F. Melusky. \u201cConcentrated Powers: Unilateral Executive Authority and Fiscal Policy Making in the American States.\u201d <span style=\"border: none windowtext 0pt; padding: 0;\"><em class=\"import-i\">Journal of Politics<\/em><\/span> 74, no. 1 (2012): 98\u2013112.<\/p>\r\n<p class=\"hanging-indent\">Lauth, Thomas P. \u201cThe Other Six: Governors Without the Line-Item Veto.\u201d <span style=\"border: none windowtext 0pt; padding: 0;\"><em class=\"import-i\">Public Budgeting &amp; Finance<\/em><\/span> 36, no. 4 (2016): 26\u201349.<\/p>\r\n<p class=\"hanging-indent\">Lynch, Travis. \u201cThe Problem with the Lieutenant Governor: A Legislative or Executive Position Under the Separation of Powers Clause.\u201d <span style=\"border: none windowtext 0pt; padding: 0;\"><em class=\"import-i\">Supra<\/em><\/span> 84 (2015): 87.<\/p>\r\n<p class=\"hanging-indent\">Marshall, William P. \u201cBreak Up the Presidency? Governors, State Attorneys, General and Lessons from the Divided Executive.\u201d <span style=\"border: none windowtext 0pt; padding: 0;\"><em class=\"import-i\">Yale Law Journal<\/em><\/span> 115 (2005): 2446.<\/p>\r\n<p class=\"hanging-indent\">Matheson, Scott M., Jr. \u201cConstitutional Status and Role of the State Attorney General.\u201d <span style=\"border: none windowtext 0pt; padding: 0;\"><em class=\"import-i\">University of Florida Journal of Law and Public Policy<\/em><\/span> 6 (1993): 1.<\/p>\r\n<p class=\"hanging-indent\">McCormack, Joseph, and Yaniv Reingewertz. \u201cPolitics, Partisanship and the Power to Veto: Does Gubernatorial Line-Item Veto Power Affect State Budgets?\u201d <span style=\"border: none windowtext 0pt; padding: 0;\"><em class=\"import-i\">Applied Economics<\/em><\/span> 50, no. 33 (2018): 3546\u20133559.<\/p>\r\n<p class=\"hanging-indent\">McGrath, Robert J., Jon C. Rogowski, and Josh M. Ryan. \u201cGubernatorial Veto Powers and the Size of Legislative Coalitions.\u201d <span style=\"border: none windowtext 0pt; padding: 0;\"><em class=\"import-i\">Legislative Studies Quarterly<\/em><\/span> 40, no. 4 (2015): 571\u2013598.<\/p>\r\n<p class=\"hanging-indent\">McGrath, Robert J., Jon C. Rogowski, and Josh M. Ryan. \u201cThe Power of Institutional Design: Governors, Vetoes, and Legislative Outcomes.\u201d In <span style=\"border: none windowtext 0pt; padding: 0;\"><em class=\"import-i\">The American Governor: Power, Constraint, and Leadership in the States<\/em><\/span>, 31\u201347. New York: Palgrave Macmillan US, 2015.<\/p>\r\n<p class=\"hanging-indent\">McLeod, Aman. \u201cThe Party on the Bench: Partisanship, Judicial Selection Commissions, and State High-Court Appointments.\u201d <span style=\"border: none windowtext 0pt; padding: 0;\"><em class=\"import-i\">Justice System Journal<\/em><\/span> 33, no. 3 (2012): 262\u2013274.<\/p>\r\n<p class=\"hanging-indent\">Miller, Mark C. \u201cState Attorneys General, Political Lawsuits, and Their Collective Voice in the Inter-Institutional Constitutional Dialogue.\u201d <span style=\"border: none windowtext 0pt; padding: 0;\"><em class=\"import-i\">Journal of Legislation<\/em><\/span> 48 (2021): 1.<\/p>\r\n<p class=\"hanging-indent\">Montjoy, Robert S. \u201cThe Public Administration of Elections.\u201d <span style=\"border: none windowtext 0pt; padding: 0;\"><em class=\"import-i\">Public Administration Review<\/em><\/span> 68, no. 5 (2008): 788\u2013799.<\/p>\r\n<p class=\"hanging-indent\">Morehouse, Sarah McCally. <span style=\"border: none windowtext 0pt; padding: 0;\"><em class=\"import-i\">The Governor as Party Leader: Campaigning and Governing<\/em><\/span>. University of Michigan Press, 1998.<\/p>\r\n<p class=\"hanging-indent\">National Governors Association. \u201cGovernors: Powers and Authority.\u201d 2024. <a href=\"https:\/\/www.nga.org\/governors\/powers-and-authority\/\"><span style=\"border: none windowtext 0pt; padding: 0;\"><span class=\"import-url\">https:\/\/www.nga.org\/governors\/powers-and-authority\/<\/span><\/span><\/a>.<\/p>\r\n<p class=\"hanging-indent\">Priest, Sharon. \u201cThe Secretaries Speak: Sixteen Points to Improve American Elections.\u201d <span style=\"border: none windowtext 0pt; padding: 0;\"><em class=\"import-i\">Election Law Journal<\/em><\/span> 1, no. 1 (2002): 71\u201374.<\/p>\r\n<p class=\"hanging-indent\">Ridolfi, Kathleen, and Seth Gordon. \u201cGubernatorial Clemency Powers: Justice or Mercy.\u201d <span style=\"border: none windowtext 0pt; padding: 0;\"><em class=\"import-i\">Criminal Justice<\/em><\/span> 24 (2009): 26.<\/p>\r\n<p class=\"hanging-indent\">Rubin, Irene. \u201cThe State of State Budget Research.\u201d <span style=\"border: none windowtext 0pt; padding: 0;\"><em class=\"import-i\">Public Budgeting &amp; Finance<\/em><\/span> 25, no. 4s (2005): 46\u201367.<\/p>\r\n<p class=\"hanging-indent\">Schelker, Mark. \u201cPublic Auditors: Empirical Evidence from the US States.\u201d Available at SSRN 957528 (2008). <a href=\"https:\/\/papers.ssrn.com\/sol3\/papers.cfm?abstract_id=957528\"><span style=\"border: none windowtext 0pt; padding: 0;\"><span class=\"import-url\">https:\/\/papers.ssrn.com\/sol3\/papers.cfm?abstract_id=957528<\/span><\/span><\/a>.<\/p>\r\n<p class=\"hanging-indent\">Schwartz, Robert. \u201cCoping with the Effectiveness Dilemma: Strategies Adopted by State Auditors.\u201d <span style=\"border: none windowtext 0pt; padding: 0;\"><em class=\"import-i\">International Review of Administrative Sciences<\/em><\/span> 65, no. 4 (1999): 511\u2013526.<\/p>\r\n<p class=\"hanging-indent\">Silver, Nate. \u201cThe Governors\u2019 Advantage in Presidential Races Is Bigger Than You Thought.\u201d FiveThirtyEight, June 15, 2011. <span style=\"border: none windowtext 0pt; padding: 0;\"><a class=\"rId112\" href=\"https:\/\/fivethirtyeight.com\/features\/the-governors-advantage-in-presidential-races-is-bigger-than-you-thought\/\"><span class=\"import-url\">https:\/\/fivethirtyeight.com\/features\/the-governors-advantage-in-presidential-races-is-bigger-than-you-thought\/<\/span><\/a><\/span>.<\/p>\r\n<p class=\"hanging-indent\">Smart, Michael, and Daniel M. Sturm. \u201cTerm Limits and Electoral Accountability.\u201d <span style=\"border: none windowtext 0pt; padding: 0;\"><em class=\"import-i\">Journal of Public Economics<\/em><\/span> 107 (2013): 93\u2013102.<\/p>\r\n<p class=\"hanging-indent\">Tarr, G. Alan. <span style=\"border: none windowtext 0pt; padding: 0;\"><em class=\"import-i\">Understanding State Constitutions<\/em><\/span>. Princeton University Press, 2000.<\/p>\r\n<p class=\"hanging-indent\">Warnick, Ashlie C. \u201cThe Impact of Shifting from an Annual Federal Budget Cycle to a Biennial Budget Cycle: A Look at the States and the Implications for Congress.\u201d Available at SSRN 1081608 (2008). <span style=\"border: none windowtext 0pt; padding: 0;\"><a class=\"rId113\" href=\"https:\/\/papers.ssrn.com\/sol3\/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1081608\"><span class=\"import-url\">https:\/\/papers.ssrn.com\/sol3\/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1081608<\/span><\/a><\/span>.<\/p>\r\n<p class=\"hanging-indent\">Weissert, Carol S., Matthew J. Uttermark, Kenneth R. Mackie, and Alexandra Artiles. \u201cGovernors in Control: Executive Orders, State-Local Preemption, and the COVID-19 Pandemic.\u201d <span style=\"border: none windowtext 0pt; padding: 0;\"><em class=\"import-i\">Publius: The Journal of Federalism<\/em><\/span> 51, no. 3 (2021): 396\u2013428.<\/p>\r\n<p class=\"hanging-indent\">Wilkins, Vicky M., and Garry Young. \u201cThe Influence of Governors on Veto Override Attempts: A Test of Pivotal Politics.\u201d <span style=\"border: none windowtext 0pt; padding: 0;\"><em class=\"import-i\">Legislative Studies Quarterly<\/em><\/span> 27, no. 4 (2002): 557\u2013575.<\/p>\r\n<p class=\"hanging-indent\">Winder, David W., and David Hill. \u201cThe Governor and the Lieutenant Governor: Forms of Cooperation Between Two State Executives.\u201d <span style=\"border: none windowtext 0pt; padding: 0;\"><em class=\"import-i\">Politics &amp; Policy<\/em><\/span> 34, no. 3 (2006): 634\u2013656.<\/p>\r\n<p class=\"hanging-indent\">Wolak, Jennifer, and Srinivas Parinandi. \u201cDoes the Public Hold Governors Accountable for Policy Outcomes?\u201d <span style=\"border: none windowtext 0pt; padding: 0;\"><em class=\"import-i\">Political Research Quarterly<\/em><\/span> 75, no. 4 (2022): 1051\u20131064.<\/p>\r\n<p class=\"hanging-indent\">Woods, Neal D., and Michael Baranowski. \u201cGovernors and the Bureaucracy: Executive Resources as Sources of Administrative Influence.\u201d <span style=\"border: none windowtext 0pt; padding: 0;\"><em class=\"import-i\">International Journal of Public Administration<\/em><\/span> 30, no. 11 (2007): 1219\u20131230.<\/p>\r\n\r\n<\/div>\r\n<\/div>","rendered":"<div class=\"textbox textbox--examples\">\n<header class=\"textbox__header\">\n<p class=\"textbox__title\">Chapter Summary<\/p>\n<\/header>\n<div class=\"textbox__content\">\n<p class=\"import-pf\">Governors are often viewed as the most identifiable political leaders in a state, usurping the highest leaders in the legislative and executive branches and the heads of the political parties. Their formal power, however, can be limited depending on their powers in appointments, budgeting, and vetoes. This chapter begins with an overview of the chief executive, exploring the formal and informal powers while comparing the candidates who have gubernatorial ambitions to those who seek power in the statehouse.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<div class=\"textbox textbox--learning-objectives\">\n<header class=\"textbox__header\">\n<p class=\"textbox__title\">Student Learning Objectives<\/p>\n<\/header>\n<div class=\"textbox__content\">\n<p class=\"import-paft\">Upon completion of this chapter, students should be able to:<\/p>\n<ol>\n<li>Understand the organization and structure of the executive branch.<\/li>\n<li>Identify the key positions and their responsibilities within the executive branch, including the governor, lieutenant governor, attorney general, secretary of state, auditor, treasurer, comptroller, and public service commissioner.<\/li>\n<li>Evaluate the power of a governor on the basis of elected executive positions and appointed executive positions.<\/li>\n<li>Assess the characteristics of those who serve in the governor\u2019s office, including how they are different from individuals who serve in the state legislature.<\/li>\n<li>Analyze the different executive and legislative powers of a governor and consider the impact these distinctions make on policy.<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<div class=\"textbox textbox--exercises\">\n<header class=\"textbox__header\">\n<p class=\"textbox__title\">Focus Questions<\/p>\n<\/header>\n<div class=\"textbox__content\">\n<p class=\"import-paft\">These questions illustrate the main concepts covered in the chapter and should help guide discussion as well as enable students to critically analyze and apply the material covered.<\/p>\n<p class=\"import-ulf\" style=\"margin-left: 18pt; text-indent: 18pt;\">How do governors work with (and sometimes against) state legislatures in functions that both institutions share? What impact do institutional differences (i.e., full time versus part time, term limited versus non\u2013term limited) have on their power?<\/p>\n<p class=\"import-ul\" style=\"margin-left: 18pt; text-indent: 18pt;\">What role do other positions in the executive branch play in state government?<\/p>\n<p class=\"import-ul\" style=\"margin-left: 18pt; text-indent: 18pt;\">Why do governors tend to be weaker than state legislatures in policymaking authority?<\/p>\n<p class=\"import-ul\" style=\"margin-left: 18pt; text-indent: 18pt;\">What can the selection of a position in the executive branch (elected by the people or appointed by the governor) tell us about the power and authority of the governor in the state?<\/p>\n<p class=\"import-ul\" style=\"margin-left: 18pt; text-indent: 18pt;\">How do governors play a role in lawmaking and influencing the budget?<\/p>\n<p class=\"import-ul\" style=\"margin-left: 18pt; text-indent: 18pt;\">What makes campaigns and elections for governor more expensive, more desirable, and more competitive compared to other state government races?<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<h1 class=\"import-ah\">Overview of the Executive Branch<\/h1>\n<p class=\"import-paft\">The executive branch at both state and federal levels is tasked with the implementation of the laws, a tremendous undertaking given the vast responsibility of government in the twenty-first century. In many ways, the executive branch at the state level mimics its counterpart at the national level. The governor serves as the chief executive, just as the president does, and they exercise control of the bureaucracy in addition to their own staff and cabinet.<sup class=\"import-enref\"><a class=\"footnote\" title=\"Abney and Lauth, \u201cGovernor as Chief Administrator.\u201d\" id=\"return-footnote-50-1\" href=\"#footnote-50-1\" aria-label=\"Footnote 1\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[1]<\/sup><\/a><\/sup> Some positions within the executive branch at both levels even share the same name and are given similar duties: for example, the attorney general represents the government in lawsuits, and the treasurer is responsible for the government\u2019s funds.<\/p>\n<p class=\"import-p\" style=\"text-indent: 36pt;\">While there is some overlap between titles and responsibilities, a quick review of the state executive branch reveals many differences between the federal and state governments but also variations among states. The secretary of state role exists in federal and state government, but their responsibility is quite different; at the federal level, they lead diplomacy and are deeply involved in international relations, while at the state level, their primary responsibility lies in running elections. All states employ a governor but not all utilize the role of lieutenant governor. For states that do not have a secretary of state to run elections, that responsibility is given to the lieutenant governor. These distinctions can be quite confusing, but distinguishing among the powers, responsibilities, and officers within the executive branch gives us a greater understanding of the challenges but also the power that is unique to the executive relative to the legislative or judicial branches.<\/p>\n<h1 class=\"import-ah\">What Is Executive Power and Authority?<\/h1>\n<p class=\"import-paft\">The <span style=\"border: none windowtext 0pt; padding: 0;\"><strong class=\"import-b\">governor<\/strong><\/span> serves as the chief executive for the executive branch, instantly giving them a higher level of authority and status, particularly with regard to informal power, compared to the legislative branch (as discussed in <span style=\"border: none windowtext 0pt; padding: 0;\"><span class=\"import-xref\">Chapter 4<\/span><\/span>) and the judicial branch (coming up next in <span style=\"border: none windowtext 0pt; padding: 0;\"><span class=\"import-xref\">Chapter 6<\/span><\/span>).<sup class=\"import-enref\"><a class=\"footnote\" title=\"Hamman, \u201cCareer Experience.\u201d\" id=\"return-footnote-50-2\" href=\"#footnote-50-2\" aria-label=\"Footnote 2\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[2]<\/sup><\/a><\/sup> Neither the state legislature nor the state court system has a single leader with seemingly as much power as the governor. Though the different manifestations of power will be explored more later in this chapter (in <span style=\"border: none windowtext 0pt; padding: 0;\"><span class=\"import-xref\">\u201cWhat Are Executive and Legislative Gubernatorial Powers?\u201d<\/span><\/span>), the broadest understanding of executive power is derived from the constitution and from the governors themselves.<\/p>\n<p class=\"import-p\" style=\"text-indent: 36pt;\">The constitutional power of the governor outlines the rights and responsibilities of the office itself. These powers are given to anyone who occupies the office and do not vary from governor to governor, with the rare exception of constitutional changes (discussed in <span style=\"border: none windowtext 0pt; padding: 0;\"><span class=\"import-xref\">Chapter 3<\/span><\/span>).<sup class=\"import-enref\"><a class=\"footnote\" title=\"National Governors Association, \u201cGovernors: Powers and Authority.\u201d\" id=\"return-footnote-50-3\" href=\"#footnote-50-3\" aria-label=\"Footnote 3\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[3]<\/sup><\/a><\/sup> The power of the governor as chief executive does vary slightly across states, but there are some notable constants.<\/p>\n<p class=\"import-p\" style=\"text-indent: 36pt;\">Typically, governors and the executive branch as a whole are given slightly less power through the state constitution than is the legislative branch.<sup class=\"import-enref\"><a class=\"footnote\" title=\"Dinan, American State Constitutional Tradition.\" id=\"return-footnote-50-4\" href=\"#footnote-50-4\" aria-label=\"Footnote 4\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[4]<\/sup><\/a><\/sup> This is notable because the federal government\u2019s separation of powers is proudly \u201cbalanced\u201d between each of the branches. No such presumption exists in the states. The explanation for intentionally creating a slightly stronger state legislature and a slightly weaker governor and executive branch is rooted in the history of American government, particularly in the colonial era.<sup class=\"import-enref\"><a class=\"footnote\" title=\"Tarr, Understanding State Constitutions, 72.\" id=\"return-footnote-50-5\" href=\"#footnote-50-5\" aria-label=\"Footnote 5\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[5]<\/sup><\/a><\/sup> When governors were both royal appointees and given substantial power, the colonists recognized their own limited rights and never forgot the challenges of having powerful and appointed chief executives. Though some positions within the executive branch are appointed (a discussion we will elaborate on later in <span style=\"border: none windowtext 0pt; padding: 0;\"><span class=\"import-xref\">\u201cWhat Are Executive and Legislative Gubernatorial Powers?\u201d<\/span><\/span>), the former-colonists-turned-founding-fathers of state constitutions deliberately constructed executive and legislative bodies that were elected and thus responsive to the people. These are sometimes also referred to as \u201cnonunified\u201d executive branches.<sup class=\"import-enref\"><a class=\"footnote\" title=\"Kousser and Phillips, Power of American Governors, 17.\" id=\"return-footnote-50-6\" href=\"#footnote-50-6\" aria-label=\"Footnote 6\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[6]<\/sup><\/a><\/sup> (The debate between elections and appointments in filling roles in the judicial branch, with good arguments for both, will be addressed in <span style=\"border: none windowtext 0pt; padding: 0;\"><span class=\"import-xref\">Chapter 6<\/span><\/span>.)<\/p>\n<figure id=\"attachment_194\" aria-describedby=\"caption-attachment-194\" style=\"width: 500px\" class=\"wp-caption alignleft\"><img class=\"wp-image-194\" src=\"http:\/\/pressbooks.palni.org\/theexcitingdynamicsofstateandlocalgovernment\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/79\/2025\/06\/5.1.jpg\" alt=\"Nikki Haley speaks at a podium indoors.\" width=\"500\" height=\"333\" srcset=\"https:\/\/pressbooks.palni.org\/theexcitingdynamicsofstateandlocalgovernment\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/79\/2025\/06\/5.1.jpg 960w, https:\/\/pressbooks.palni.org\/theexcitingdynamicsofstateandlocalgovernment\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/79\/2025\/06\/5.1-300x200.jpg 300w, https:\/\/pressbooks.palni.org\/theexcitingdynamicsofstateandlocalgovernment\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/79\/2025\/06\/5.1-768x512.jpg 768w, https:\/\/pressbooks.palni.org\/theexcitingdynamicsofstateandlocalgovernment\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/79\/2025\/06\/5.1-65x43.jpg 65w, https:\/\/pressbooks.palni.org\/theexcitingdynamicsofstateandlocalgovernment\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/79\/2025\/06\/5.1-225x150.jpg 225w, https:\/\/pressbooks.palni.org\/theexcitingdynamicsofstateandlocalgovernment\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/79\/2025\/06\/5.1-350x233.jpg 350w\" \/><figcaption id=\"caption-attachment-194\" class=\"wp-caption-text\"><strong><span class=\"import-fighn\">Figure 5.1 &#8211; <\/span>South Carolina Governor Nikki Haley Giving Address at a Public Event in 2014<br \/>Source: &#8220;<a href=\"https:\/\/commons.wikimedia.org\/wiki\/File:South_Carolina_Gov._Nikki_Haley_joins_U.S._military_service_members_and_community_business_partners_for_the_launch_of_Operation_Palmetto_Employment,_a_statewide_military_employment_initiative_aimed_at_making_140226-F-XH297-660.jpg\"><span class=\"mw-page-title-main\">South Carolina Gov. Nikki Haley joins U.S. military service members and community business partners &#8230;<\/span><\/a>&#8221; by Staff Sgt. Jorge Intriago\/United States Air Force on Wikimedia Commons \/ <a href=\"https:\/\/creativecommons.org\/public-domain\/pdm\/\">Public Domain.<\/a><\/strong><\/figcaption><\/figure>\n<p class=\"import-p\" style=\"text-indent: 36pt;\">In addition to having slightly less power than their legislatures, governors are given traditional authority over the bureaucracy and the implementation of the laws.<sup class=\"import-enref\"><a class=\"footnote\" title=\"Tarr, Understanding State Constitutions, 156; National Governors Association, \u201cGovernors: Powers and Authority\u201d; Woods and Baranowski, \u201cGovernors and the Bureaucracy.\u201d\" id=\"return-footnote-50-7\" href=\"#footnote-50-7\" aria-label=\"Footnote 7\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[7]<\/sup><\/a><\/sup> They oversee the executive branch, including appointments for key leadership positions, and in states where they do use judicial appointments, governors play a role in nominating candidates to the bench.<sup class=\"import-enref\"><a class=\"footnote\" title=\"McLeod, \u201cParty on the Bench.\u201d\" id=\"return-footnote-50-8\" href=\"#footnote-50-8\" aria-label=\"Footnote 8\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[8]<\/sup><\/a><\/sup> This oversight underpins the justification for executive orders, which enable a governor to make policy proclamations of limited authority in the name of fully executing the laws. This allows governors one way to fulfill their own goals for leading the state while in office. They also are involved in the legislative process, promoting legislation that aligns with their objectives but also theoretically represents the interests of the entire state, differing from the primary legislative focus, which emphasizes district and constituent benefits. Appointments, and particularly the breadth and depth of offices in which positions are appointed by the governor, demonstrate an essential constitutional power.<\/p>\n<p class=\"import-p\" style=\"text-indent: 36pt;\">Another <span style=\"border: none windowtext 0pt; padding: 0;\"><strong class=\"import-b\">formal power<\/strong><\/span> listed in the constitution for governors is introducing the state budget.<sup class=\"import-enref\"><a class=\"footnote\" title=\"Council of State Governments, Book of the States.\" id=\"return-footnote-50-9\" href=\"#footnote-50-9\" aria-label=\"Footnote 9\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[9]<\/sup><\/a><\/sup> This is a shared responsibility, much like appointments and passing legislation, because the governor requires collaboration with the state legislature in order to complete it. After all, it is the legislature that must pass the budget through both chambers in order for it to make it to the governor\u2019s desk again for signature. The governor has some latitude in the budgeting process, though, especially in considering statewide needs and interests and major initiatives that align with their own agenda and match or reinforce the goals of the legislature. Depending on the legislative and budgeting cycle, the governor can indicate the important points of the state budget in the annual state of the state address and in appeals to the public. These signal to the constituents what the priorities are and what the governor deems most important. Internally, the governor must work with the leaders in the legislature to advocate for their budget items and work to align goals across both branches of government.<sup class=\"import-enref\"><a class=\"footnote\" title=\"Kousser and Phillips, Power of American Governors.\" id=\"return-footnote-50-10\" href=\"#footnote-50-10\" aria-label=\"Footnote 10\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[10]<\/sup><\/a><\/sup><\/p>\n<p class=\"import-p\" style=\"text-indent: 36pt;\">Finally, the last major constitutional power of governors lies in their ability to approve or kill legislation, a vital step in the policymaking process at the state level. When both chambers of the legislature have passed a bill, it lands on the desk of the governor. Governors can sign the bill into law, and the process, from a creation perspective, is complete (the real work in implementation, though, has just begun for the executive branch). But what happens when a governor disagrees with the bill? Governors have veto power, which gives them the authority to reject a bill in its presented form, forcing the state legislature to either redress the bill to accommodate the governor\u2019s wishes, override the veto with a supermajority of legislative support in both chambers, or abandon the bill entirely to revisit at another time or in a different way.<sup class=\"import-enref\"><a class=\"footnote\" title=\"McGrath, Rogowski, and Ryan et al., \u201cPower of Institutional Design,\u201d 31\u201347; Wilkins and Young, \u201cInfluence of Governors,\u201d 557\u2013575; Kousser and Phillips, Power of American Governors.\" id=\"return-footnote-50-11\" href=\"#footnote-50-11\" aria-label=\"Footnote 11\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[11]<\/sup><\/a><\/sup><\/p>\n<p class=\"import-p\" style=\"text-indent: 36pt;\"><span style=\"border: none windowtext 0pt; padding: 0;\"><strong class=\"import-b\">Veto power<\/strong><\/span> can vary and will be discussed in this chapter later in greater detail (see <span style=\"border: none windowtext 0pt; padding: 0;\"><span class=\"import-xref\">\u201cWhat Are Executive and Legislative Gubernatorial Powers?\u201d<\/span><\/span>). But this formalized power protects the executive branch from an overpowering legislature and offers an important institutional check in the lawmaking process.<sup class=\"import-enref\"><a class=\"footnote\" title=\"Herzik and Wiggins, \u201cGovernors vs. Legislatures,\u201d 841.\" id=\"return-footnote-50-12\" href=\"#footnote-50-12\" aria-label=\"Footnote 12\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[12]<\/sup><\/a><\/sup><\/p>\n<p class=\"import-p\" style=\"text-indent: 36pt;\">In addition to the formal powers that are given to every person who occupies the governor\u2019s office, each governor has the opportunity to utilize <span style=\"border: none windowtext 0pt; padding: 0;\"><strong class=\"import-b\">informal power<\/strong><\/span> unique to their own circumstances and personality. Informal powers are those that are not outlined in the constitution or statutes but exercised by the individual in office\u2014meaning, of course, that these can vary widely across administrations. Examples of informal power can include unique personal background or circumstances, charisma or personality, and outreach.<\/p>\n<p class=\"import-p\" style=\"text-indent: 36pt;\">Though many candidates who seek the governorship have some prior political experience, they often have other life experiences that may help them separate themselves from their opponents. Politics tends to be dominated by lawyers, and mastery and understanding of the law are certainly helpful in holding public office, especially in a role that is responsible for the law\u2019s implementation.<sup class=\"import-enref\"><a class=\"footnote\" title=\"Carsey, Campaign Dynamics.\" id=\"return-footnote-50-13\" href=\"#footnote-50-13\" aria-label=\"Footnote 13\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[13]<\/sup><\/a><\/sup> Every experience can lend itself to public service, despite the initial obvious relevance. Jesse \u201cThe Body\u201d Ventura was a wrestler before he successfully ran to serve as governor of Minnesota; Arnold Schwarzenegger likewise had a storied career in film and bodybuilding before voters selected him to serve as their governor in California. Both men understood the importance of performance and connecting with an audience, two qualities that are useful in politics.<\/p>\n<p class=\"import-p\" style=\"text-indent: 36pt;\">Increasingly, we have seen more candidates from other professional backgrounds run for governor, even newcomers to politics who have not held an elected office before declaring their gubernatorial candidacy. This will be discussed in more detail later in the book (<span style=\"border: none windowtext 0pt; padding: 0;\"><span class=\"import-xref\">Chapter 9<\/span><\/span>). Many governors have presidential aspirations as well, using the highest executive office at the state level as a platform to run for the highest executive office at the federal level. One advantage these candidates have is their experience with unilateral executive skills and collaboration with legislative branches through their role as governor.<sup class=\"import-enref\"><a class=\"footnote\" title=\"Silver, \u201cGovernors\u2019 Advantage.\u201d\" id=\"return-footnote-50-14\" href=\"#footnote-50-14\" aria-label=\"Footnote 14\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[14]<\/sup><\/a><\/sup> Governors from larger states or those who are well known on their own accord tend to be more successful as well.<\/p>\n<p class=\"import-p\" style=\"text-indent: 36pt;\">Some governors are notably charismatic, well regarded in public speaking, or especially personable. These characteristics are all widely subjective among voters, but aligned with the right circumstances (partisanship of the electorate, resonance of salient issues, mobilization of support, etc.), they can aid a governor in their efforts.<sup class=\"import-enref\"><a class=\"footnote\" title=\"Jensen et al., \u201cCombating COVID-19,\u201d 101702; Barth and Ferguson, \u201cAmerican Governors,\u201d 268\u2013282; Carsey et al., \u201cStrategic Candidates,\u201d 269\u2013298.\" id=\"return-footnote-50-15\" href=\"#footnote-50-15\" aria-label=\"Footnote 15\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[15]<\/sup><\/a><\/sup> An eloquent governor can harness their outstanding speaking skills to convince lawmakers to revisit their issue or address the public in a press conference to convey a particular message. Being able to effectively reach out or connect with voters is essential for any successful candidate, but governors who display an unusual ability to really resonate with their supporters can likewise leverage that relationship and translate it into policy support. Even if a governor is faced with an antagonistic legislature, public appeals to supporters, who can then put pressure on their representative, can be an effective outsider strategy.<\/p>\n<p class=\"import-p\" style=\"text-indent: 36pt;\">The governor is also the de facto chief of the party. Though the statewide political parties have organizations with actual party chairs, those individuals are typically only known widely to party insiders. They fulfill important administrative functions, but the governor serves in a more pronounced and visible role, so the office serves as a de facto name and face of the party as its most prominent statewide officeholder.<sup class=\"import-enref\"><a class=\"footnote\" title=\"Morehouse, Governor as Party Leader.\" id=\"return-footnote-50-16\" href=\"#footnote-50-16\" aria-label=\"Footnote 16\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[16]<\/sup><\/a><\/sup><\/p>\n<p class=\"import-p\" style=\"text-indent: 36pt;\">The informal powers come with the person, not the office, so they change as often as the occupant of the position does. Learning how to productively utilize them, though, can prove to be an incredible advantage for a governor, working in other branches like the legislature but also with other offices in their own executive branch too.<\/p>\n<h1 class=\"import-ah\">What Are Positions in the Executive Branch?<\/h1>\n<p class=\"import-paft\">The governor does represent the head of the executive branch and is also seen as the de facto leader of the state as the political figure most recognized and associated with the state they represent. The executive branch, however, comprises many different positions, both elected and appointed (and even those that are hired as part of the bureaucracy). Some of these positions, such as the heads of agencies and departments within the executive branch, are appointed by the governor and thus report and respond to the person in that office. Many of the high-level statewide executive offices, though, are not necessarily appointed. As is true for many features of state government, the selection method and the actual offices and responsibilities associated with them do vary across the states. To better understand what these other executive positions are, we will review the most common statewide executive offices and explore their primary functions and how they are selected. When possible, details about the office are included to illustrate the wide range of diversity in how state executive branches are organized and operate.<\/p>\n<h2 class=\"import-bh\">Lieutenant Governor<\/h2>\n<p class=\"import-paft\">The <span style=\"border: none windowtext 0pt; padding: 0;\"><strong class=\"import-b\">lieutenant governor<\/strong><\/span> role is sometimes viewed as the state-level equivalent of the vice presidency from the national government. Indeed, some parallels exist, making this precursory comparison understandable. Some states elect their governors \/ lieutenant governors on the same ticket, as we do for the president \/ vice president; some states imbue a culture where the lieutenant governor is often seen as the next in line for the governorship broadly (and next in line legally in the unfortunate case of a succession plan in action); and finally, some state constitutions provide relatively little unilateral power to the lieutenant governor role, so their primary responsibility is to help campaign for and support the issues important to the governor.<sup class=\"import-enref\"><a class=\"footnote\" title=\"Briffault, \u201cSkelos v. Paterson,\u201d 675.\" id=\"return-footnote-50-17\" href=\"#footnote-50-17\" aria-label=\"Footnote 17\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[17]<\/sup><\/a><\/sup><\/p>\n<figure id=\"attachment_193\" aria-describedby=\"caption-attachment-193\" style=\"width: 500px\" class=\"wp-caption alignright\"><img class=\"wp-image-193\" src=\"http:\/\/pressbooks.palni.org\/theexcitingdynamicsofstateandlocalgovernment\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/79\/2025\/06\/5.2.jpg\" alt=\"Lieutenant Governor Albert Brewer takes the oath of office in 1968.\" width=\"500\" height=\"356\" srcset=\"https:\/\/pressbooks.palni.org\/theexcitingdynamicsofstateandlocalgovernment\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/79\/2025\/06\/5.2.jpg 960w, https:\/\/pressbooks.palni.org\/theexcitingdynamicsofstateandlocalgovernment\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/79\/2025\/06\/5.2-300x214.jpg 300w, https:\/\/pressbooks.palni.org\/theexcitingdynamicsofstateandlocalgovernment\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/79\/2025\/06\/5.2-768x547.jpg 768w, https:\/\/pressbooks.palni.org\/theexcitingdynamicsofstateandlocalgovernment\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/79\/2025\/06\/5.2-65x46.jpg 65w, https:\/\/pressbooks.palni.org\/theexcitingdynamicsofstateandlocalgovernment\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/79\/2025\/06\/5.2-225x160.jpg 225w, https:\/\/pressbooks.palni.org\/theexcitingdynamicsofstateandlocalgovernment\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/79\/2025\/06\/5.2-350x249.jpg 350w\" \/><figcaption id=\"caption-attachment-193\" class=\"wp-caption-text\"><strong><span class=\"import-fighn\">Figure 5.2 &#8211; <\/span>Alabama Lieutenant Governor Albert Brewer Sworn in as Governor upon the Death of Incumbent Governor Lurleen Wallace in 1968<br \/>Source: &#8220;<a href=\"https:\/\/commons.wikimedia.org\/wiki\/File:Albert_Brewer_oath_of_office.jpg\"><span class=\"mw-page-title-main\">Albert Brewer oath of office&#8221;<\/span><\/a> by the Brewer for Governor Committee on Wikimedia Commons \/ <a href=\"https:\/\/creativecommons.org\/public-domain\/pdm\/\">Public Domain.<\/a><\/strong><\/figcaption><\/figure>\n<p class=\"import-p\" style=\"text-indent: 36pt;\">Assuming the lieutenant governor and the vice president were essentially the same role would be an oversimplification that ignores some of the unique characteristics of the position of lieutenant governor. First, not all states actually have this office. Forty-five out of fifty states do utilize a lieutenant governor; only Georgia, Tennessee, Texas, and West Virginia do not.<sup class=\"import-enref\"><a class=\"footnote\" title=\"Some states have recently added the role of a lieutenant governor, but it was not originally in their state constitution. Arizona voters approved this new post in 2022 to go into effect in 2026, while New Jersey created the position in 2005 with the first lieutenant governor elected in 2010.\" id=\"return-footnote-50-18\" href=\"#footnote-50-18\" aria-label=\"Footnote 18\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[18]<\/sup><\/a><\/sup> The amount of power and actual constitutional responsibility of the office still varies among the forty-five states that do have it.<sup class=\"import-enref\"><a class=\"footnote\" title=\"Freedman and Thai, \u201cLittle Newspaper Coverage,\u201d 82\u2013100.\" id=\"return-footnote-50-19\" href=\"#footnote-50-19\" aria-label=\"Footnote 19\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[19]<\/sup><\/a><\/sup> In a legal capacity, the lieutenant governor is the state\u2019s next-highest officer and does follow the governor in the line of succession if the unfortunate moment arises. However, in less tragic circumstances, they represent the governor and stand in when the governor simply can\u2019t, whether it is to welcome visitors at a state convention or to tour a factory that would benefit from the governor\u2019s economic policy proposal.<sup class=\"import-enref\"><a class=\"footnote\" title=\"Winder and Hill, \u201cGovernor and the Lieutenant Governor,\u201d 634\u2013656.\" id=\"return-footnote-50-20\" href=\"#footnote-50-20\" aria-label=\"Footnote 20\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[20]<\/sup><\/a><\/sup><\/p>\n<p class=\"import-p\" style=\"text-indent: 36pt;\">Like the vice president role at the federal level, lieutenant governors may also serve as the presiding leader over the upper chamber of the state assembly (typically known as the state senate). At the federal level, the vice president provides this role to the US Senate. Generally, the lieutenant governor has the authority to preside, break ties in votes when needed, and conduct some manner of business in the chamber. The roles of the Senate president pro tempore and majority and minority leaders are also essential in conducting legislative business (discussed in <span style=\"border: none windowtext 0pt; padding: 0;\"><span class=\"import-xref\">Chapter 4<\/span><\/span>).<\/p>\n<p class=\"import-p\" style=\"text-indent: 36pt;\">While they do share succession and senate powers, lieutenant governors differ from their federal counterparts in their relationship to the governor. As noted earlier, not all run on the same ticket as the governor. Seventeen states elect their lieutenant governor separately from their governor. This provides the lieutenant governor role with more power and authority to act separately from the governor, perhaps even coming from a different political party, making their relationship even more interesting.<sup class=\"import-enref\"><a class=\"footnote\" title=\"Briffault, \u201cSkelos v. Paterson,\u201d 675.\" id=\"return-footnote-50-21\" href=\"#footnote-50-21\" aria-label=\"Footnote 21\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[21]<\/sup><\/a><\/sup> This can become especially complicated when the governor may leave the state for a certain period and the de facto actor in their absence is a lieutenant governor who may share a very different perspective from the governor and now has an opportunity to act on that view with executive power. These \u201cdivided executives\u201d mean rivalries can run rampant and deep within the executive branch. It also dilutes the governor\u2019s power and influence over their next-in-line colleague.<\/p>\n<p class=\"import-p\" style=\"text-indent: 36pt;\">Some states give lieutenant governors broad policy power, convenient considering their role as the senate president.<sup class=\"import-enref\"><a class=\"footnote\" title=\"Lynch, \u201cProblem with the Lieutenant Governor,\u201d 87.\" id=\"return-footnote-50-22\" href=\"#footnote-50-22\" aria-label=\"Footnote 22\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[22]<\/sup><\/a><\/sup> They cannot singly author legislation, but they can identify advocates in the legislature to do that with them, and then lieutenant governors can employ their platform to rally support, both externally with the public and internally within the legislative branch, to pass the policy into law.<sup class=\"import-enref\"><a class=\"footnote\" title=\"Winder and Hill, \u201cGovernor and the Lieutenant Governor,\u201d 634\u2013656.\" id=\"return-footnote-50-23\" href=\"#footnote-50-23\" aria-label=\"Footnote 23\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[23]<\/sup><\/a><\/sup> For states that do not have a secretary of state role, the lieutenant governor may also have the authority to oversee election administration, which is a large and important undertaking.<\/p>\n<h2 class=\"import-bh\">Attorney General<\/h2>\n<p class=\"import-paft\">Just as the post of lieutenant governor is held in the executive branch but integrally involved in the legislative branch through the state senate, the <span style=\"border: none windowtext 0pt; padding: 0;\"><strong class=\"import-b\">attorney general<\/strong><\/span> role straddles both the executive and judicial branches through its power.<sup class=\"import-enref\"><a class=\"footnote\" title=\"Marshall, \u201cBreak Up the Presidency,\u201d 2446.\" id=\"return-footnote-50-24\" href=\"#footnote-50-24\" aria-label=\"Footnote 24\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[24]<\/sup><\/a><\/sup> The attorney general is the chief legal counsel for the state and is responsible for representing the state in lawsuits. They advise the state government in legal matters and lead the enforcement of state laws. This is in addition to upholding federal laws as well, since the attorney general is sworn to uphold the constitution of both levels of government and thus holds responsibility for the enforcement of both.<\/p>\n<p class=\"import-p\" style=\"text-indent: 36pt;\">The position of attorney general is viewed as so vital to the policy process that all fifty states have it as part of their executive branch.<sup class=\"import-enref\"><a class=\"footnote\" title=\"Matheson, \u201cConstitutional Status and Role,\u201d 1.\" id=\"return-footnote-50-25\" href=\"#footnote-50-25\" aria-label=\"Footnote 25\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[25]<\/sup><\/a><\/sup> In most states, the role is selected through popular elections, like the governor\u2019s office. Only seven states do not offer elections for the attorney general; in those states, the position is determined by gubernatorial appointment (Alaska, Hawaii, New Hampshire, New Jersey, and Wyoming), judicial appointment (Tennessee), or legislative election (Maine).<\/p>\n<p class=\"import-p\" style=\"text-indent: 36pt;\">Because of their leadership in law enforcement and representation of the state in lawsuits, the attorney general role is often viewed as very powerful, sometimes usurping the attention from and upstaging the lieutenant governor\u2019s role, particularly in the states where that position has relatively little unilateral authority.<sup class=\"import-enref\"><a class=\"footnote\" title=\"Citron, \u201cPrivacy Policymaking,\u201d 747; Marshall, \u201cBreak Up the Presidency,\u201d 2446.\" id=\"return-footnote-50-26\" href=\"#footnote-50-26\" aria-label=\"Footnote 26\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[26]<\/sup><\/a><\/sup> Depending on the state, the office of attorney general also can be in charge of the state\u2019s department of justice. To continue with the comparisons of federal offices, this would be equivalent to the relationship of the attorney general of the United States and their relationship with the US Department of Justice. Attorneys general serve as both political and legal actors and, as such, can use important and interesting lawsuits to leverage their own position in the public eye.<sup class=\"import-enref\"><a class=\"footnote\" title=\"Miller, \u201cState Attorneys General,\u201d 1.\" id=\"return-footnote-50-27\" href=\"#footnote-50-27\" aria-label=\"Footnote 27\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[27]<\/sup><\/a><\/sup><\/p>\n<p class=\"import-p\" style=\"text-indent: 36pt;\">It is important to note that the power of the attorney general\u2019s office can also be impacted by their own term and tenure power (much as we will see with the governor later in this chapter, in <span style=\"border: none windowtext 0pt; padding: 0;\"><span class=\"import-xref\">\u201cWhat Are Legislative and Executive Gubernatorial Powers?\u201d<\/span><\/span>).<sup class=\"import-enref\"><a class=\"footnote\" title=\"Earley, \u201cSpecial Solicitude,\u201d 561.\" id=\"return-footnote-50-28\" href=\"#footnote-50-28\" aria-label=\"Footnote 28\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[28]<\/sup><\/a><\/sup> Most states employ a four-year term, which mimics similar gubernatorial standards. Yet there is significant variation in other states between shorter terms (such as in Maine, which limits the attorney general to a two-year term) and longer ones (as we see in Tennessee with an eight-year term). Term length serves as a sort of deadline for occupants of the office, though only term limits and removal cease an incumbents\u2019 service.<\/p>\n<h2 class=\"import-bh\">Secretary of State<\/h2>\n<p class=\"import-paft\">The <span style=\"border: none windowtext 0pt; padding: 0;\"><strong class=\"import-b\">secretary of state<\/strong><\/span> role, much like that of the attorney general, is viewed as one of the more powerful posts in the executive branch. It has garnered significantly more attention in the last several election cycles compared to its more innocuous public perception in earlier history; this can be attributed to the increasing debates over voter enfranchisement, security, fraud, and other claims that are reflected in the policies the office implements. Elections serve as an exciting example of shared powers of federalism in action, and the debates play out in policies such as the availability of early or absentee voting, the process of ballot access, the timing of voter registration, and the IDs needed (or not) to cast a ballot.<sup class=\"import-enref\"><a class=\"footnote\" title=\"Montjoy, \u201cPublic Administration of Elections,\u201d 788\u2013799; Priest, \u201cSecretaries Speak,\u201d 71\u201374.\" id=\"return-footnote-50-29\" href=\"#footnote-50-29\" aria-label=\"Footnote 29\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[29]<\/sup><\/a><\/sup><\/p>\n<figure id=\"attachment_215\" aria-describedby=\"caption-attachment-215\" style=\"width: 225px\" class=\"wp-caption alignleft\"><img class=\"wp-image-215 size-medium\" src=\"http:\/\/pressbooks.palni.org\/theexcitingdynamicsofstateandlocalgovernment\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/79\/2025\/05\/5.3-new-225x300.jpg\" alt=\"Hon. Brad Raffensperger\" width=\"225\" height=\"300\" srcset=\"https:\/\/pressbooks.palni.org\/theexcitingdynamicsofstateandlocalgovernment\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/79\/2025\/05\/5.3-new-225x300.jpg 225w, https:\/\/pressbooks.palni.org\/theexcitingdynamicsofstateandlocalgovernment\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/79\/2025\/05\/5.3-new-768x1024.jpg 768w, https:\/\/pressbooks.palni.org\/theexcitingdynamicsofstateandlocalgovernment\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/79\/2025\/05\/5.3-new-1152x1536.jpg 1152w, https:\/\/pressbooks.palni.org\/theexcitingdynamicsofstateandlocalgovernment\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/79\/2025\/05\/5.3-new-1536x2048.jpg 1536w, https:\/\/pressbooks.palni.org\/theexcitingdynamicsofstateandlocalgovernment\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/79\/2025\/05\/5.3-new-65x87.jpg 65w, https:\/\/pressbooks.palni.org\/theexcitingdynamicsofstateandlocalgovernment\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/79\/2025\/05\/5.3-new-350x467.jpg 350w, https:\/\/pressbooks.palni.org\/theexcitingdynamicsofstateandlocalgovernment\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/79\/2025\/05\/5.3-new-scaled.jpg 1920w\" \/><figcaption id=\"caption-attachment-215\" class=\"wp-caption-text\"><strong>Figure 5.3 &#8211; Georgia Secretary of State Brad Raffensperger, Embroiled in the 2020 Presidential Election, 2022<br \/>Source: &#8220;<span class=\"mw-page-title-main\"><a href=\"https:\/\/flickr.com\/photos\/9133668@N08\/52531507771\">Brad Raffensperger 2022<\/a>&#8221; by <\/span><span style=\"orphans: 1; text-align: initial; font-size: 1em;\">Knight Foundation on Flickr\/ <a href=\"https:\/\/creativecommons.org\/licenses\/by-sa\/2.0\/deed.en\">CC BY-SA.<\/a><\/span><\/strong><\/figcaption><\/figure>\n<p class=\"import-p\" style=\"text-indent: 36pt;\">Because of this important role, most state constitutions do have a secretary of state office, with only three that do not. In Alaska, Hawaii, and Utah, the responsibilities typically designated to the secretary of state are instead assigned to the lieutenant governor, making that office a little bit more powerful than in the states that have a secretary of state. Inversely, in the three states that do not have a lieutenant governor, the office of the secretary of state is placed first in line in the order of succession. Additionally, three other states (Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, and Virginia) employ a \u201csecretary of the commonwealth,\u201d which is the constitutional equivalent of the secretary of state.<\/p>\n<p class=\"import-p\" style=\"text-indent: 36pt;\">At the federal level, the secretary of state is often seen as a leader in diplomacy and international relations. At the state level, this is a great example of where an office might share the same name but is clearly different with regard to responsibilities. The secretary of state is in charge of elections, oftentimes serving as the chief election officer for the state. They are also responsible for overseeing businesses in the state, usually responsible for administering the Uniform Commercial Code. This extensive set of codes is a national standard that is used almost in its entirety by all the states as a way to universalize business transactions across states to make conducting business easier and more efficient. Finally, the office can also be responsible for notaries of the public and recordkeeping for official state records (both those of government, like executive orders, and also those for citizens, like marriage certificates).<\/p>\n<h2 class=\"import-bh\">Auditor<\/h2>\n<p class=\"import-paft\"><span style=\"border: none windowtext 0pt; padding: 0;\"><strong class=\"import-b\">State auditors<\/strong><\/span> provide an essential fiduciary function in state government, particularly valuable in the twenty-first century as states\u2019 roles, involvement, and budgets expand. They serve as auditors of state funds, which do not belong to them or their office but rather are the funds of and for the taxpayers.<sup class=\"import-enref\"><a class=\"footnote\" title=\"Council of State Governments, Book of the States.\u201cBook of the States, Volume 53.\u201d\" id=\"return-footnote-50-30\" href=\"#footnote-50-30\" aria-label=\"Footnote 30\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[30]<\/sup><\/a><\/sup> This fiduciary responsibility is important, and auditors ensure that those funds are being spent appropriately and in accordance with the law.<\/p>\n<p class=\"import-p\" style=\"text-indent: 36pt;\">Most broadly, the auditor\u2019s job is to examine accounts and identify and eliminate issues.<sup class=\"import-enref\"><a class=\"footnote\" title=\"Schwartz, \u201cCoping with the Effectiveness Dilemma,\u201d 511\u2013526.\" id=\"return-footnote-50-31\" href=\"#footnote-50-31\" aria-label=\"Footnote 31\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[31]<\/sup><\/a><\/sup> Sometimes, these can be malicious, such as abuse or fraud; other times, ill intent may not be at play, but issues involving waste and redundancies are also undesirable, and under their fiduciary responsibility to the public, the auditors also work to detect these problems. Some of the processes auditors use to find issues and address them include auditing public financial statements, verifying compliance with regulations, and evaluating the performance and processes of programs. There are also independent external auditors who provide a similar function to ensure the legitimacy and accountability of the auditors, but these positions are privately operated, and they are not public officials in the executive branch.<\/p>\n<p class=\"import-p\" style=\"text-indent: 36pt;\">The auditor is selected through either popular election, legislative appointment, or gubernatorial appointment. In cases in which the governor does get to select the auditor, the appointment process still involves the state legislature in either the initial nomination or subsequent confirmation. The role of the auditor requires specific professional training, making it more similar to the attorney general and less like the secretary of state or lieutenant governor.<sup class=\"import-enref\"><a class=\"footnote\" title=\"Schelker, \u201cPublic Auditors.\u201d\" id=\"return-footnote-50-32\" href=\"#footnote-50-32\" aria-label=\"Footnote 32\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[32]<\/sup><\/a><\/sup> There is also a keen interest in neutrality, a feature important in any elected office, but that does not mean they are necessarily apolitical.<sup class=\"import-enref\"><a class=\"footnote\" title=\"Hornbeck and Malin, \u201cState Auditors,\u201d 1047\u20131075.\" id=\"return-footnote-50-33\" href=\"#footnote-50-33\" aria-label=\"Footnote 33\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[33]<\/sup><\/a><\/sup> Neutrality is particularly valuable for the auditor because of the office\u2019s vested fiduciary responsibility.<\/p>\n<p class=\"import-p\" style=\"text-indent: 36pt;\">It is important to note here that some states also have a separate office known as the comptroller, discussed in the next section. In the states that do not have a comptroller, those responsibilities fall under the purview of the auditor\u2019s office.<\/p>\n<h2 class=\"import-bh\">Comptroller<\/h2>\n<p class=\"import-paft\">The office of the <span style=\"border: none windowtext 0pt; padding: 0;\"><strong class=\"import-b\">comptroller<\/strong><\/span> may be one that is less recognizable to readers, in part because it is less utilized in state governments. Only nine states presently use a separately elected comptroller, and they tend to be larger states with greater populations, more professionalized state legislatures, and larger state budgets accompanied by greater state services. The states that have a comptroller (or controller, as the office is referred to in California) include California, Connecticut, Florida, Illinois, Maryland, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, and Texas.<sup class=\"import-enref\"><a class=\"footnote\" title=\"Bentley, \u201cNew York State Comptroller,\u201d 761.\" id=\"return-footnote-50-34\" href=\"#footnote-50-34\" aria-label=\"Footnote 34\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[34]<\/sup><\/a><\/sup><\/p>\n<p class=\"import-p\" style=\"text-indent: 36pt;\">The comptroller generally serves a preaudit for expenditures from the state legislature, a particularly important and arduous task for those states with larger budgets, services, and legislative actions.<sup class=\"import-enref\"><a class=\"footnote\" title=\"Hevesi, \u201cStandards for Internal Control.\u201d\" id=\"return-footnote-50-35\" href=\"#footnote-50-35\" aria-label=\"Footnote 35\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[35]<\/sup><\/a><\/sup> As noted, the auditor reviews receipts after the funds have been spent to ensure they have been spent in accordance with the law and statutes. The comptroller provides a similar oversight before the disbursement of funds. In a small state, there might be less demand for tasks, or they could be subsumed into the auditor\u2019s own office. For a large state with much more money and tasks at stake, requiring a preaudit before expenditures occur can ensure funds are not mismanaged and costly errors are caught before they are incurred.<\/p>\n<h2 class=\"import-bh\">Treasurer<\/h2>\n<p class=\"import-paft\">State <span style=\"border: none windowtext 0pt; padding: 0;\"><strong class=\"import-b\">treasurers<\/strong><\/span> are the chief custodians of the state government, dealing directly with the funds both coming in and going out. They are sometimes also referred to as the state\u2019s head bankers, though it is worth clarifying that they are still publicly elected officials.<sup class=\"import-enref\"><a class=\"footnote\" title=\"Bunch and Ferrara, \u201cFactors to Consider,\u201d 32\u201351.\" id=\"return-footnote-50-36\" href=\"#footnote-50-36\" aria-label=\"Footnote 36\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[36]<\/sup><\/a><\/sup> Almost every state has a treasurer, with two notable exceptions. New York removed the office and transferred the treasurer\u2019s powers to the comptroller in 1926, and Texas did the same in 1996. In both these states, the comptroller thus holds more power and responsibility.<\/p>\n<p class=\"import-p\" style=\"text-indent: 36pt;\">As the chief money manager, the treasurer has authority over investments, budget surpluses and deficits, and funds received and deposited. Like the roles of auditor and comptroller, the treasurer\u2019s office has a fiduciary responsibility to the public to manage funds wisely. This is particularly relevant in terms of investments; while there is additional oversight and transparency in making and reviewing the investments, it is a major responsibility of the treasurer to ensure that these are made in line with the law and in a prudent manner. When money is owed to the state, most often in the form of taxes, it is paid to the treasurer, and likewise, when money is given from the state, it comes from the treasurer.<\/p>\n<p class=\"import-p\" style=\"text-indent: 36pt;\">Overseeing the state\u2019s budget surplus or deficit is a vital part of state treasury management.<sup class=\"import-enref\"><a class=\"footnote\" title=\"Rubin, \u201cState of State Budget Research,\u201d 46\u201367.\" id=\"return-footnote-50-37\" href=\"#footnote-50-37\" aria-label=\"Footnote 37\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[37]<\/sup><\/a><\/sup> Not all states have balanced budget provisions in their constitutions, and several factors can influence the variation in budget predictability from year to year. For example, states that budget biannually (once every two years) save some time in the budgeting process from going through it annually but also may struggle with accurate modeling in predicting what revenue will come in and what expenditures will go out, relying on two-year-old data.<sup class=\"import-enref\"><a class=\"footnote\" title=\"Warnick, \u201cImpact of Shifting.\u201d\" id=\"return-footnote-50-38\" href=\"#footnote-50-38\" aria-label=\"Footnote 38\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[38]<\/sup><\/a><\/sup> The governor and legislature are ultimately responsible for the budget, but it is up to the treasurer to keep track of the surplus or deficit incurred.<\/p>\n<h1 class=\"import-ah\">What Are Executive and Legislative Gubernatorial Powers?<\/h1>\n<p class=\"import-paft\">It is nearly impossible to discuss the powers of the executive branch without discussing its interactions with the other branches of government, especially the legislative branch. This is in part because the governor shares authority with the legislature in making laws, and the policymaking process cannot happen unilaterally without the involvement of both branches of government. Though the governor is an officer of the executive branch, they embody powers within both the legislative branch and the executive. These powers will be examined more here.<\/p>\n<h2 class=\"import-bh\">Executive Powers<\/h2>\n<p class=\"import-paft\">As the chief executive of the state, the governor holds some unilateral power and shared authority within the executive branch.<sup class=\"import-enref\"><a class=\"footnote\" title=\"Krause and Melusky, \u201cConcentrated Powers,\u201d 98\u2013112.\" id=\"return-footnote-50-39\" href=\"#footnote-50-39\" aria-label=\"Footnote 39\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[39]<\/sup><\/a><\/sup> Many of the responsibilities of the governor are affected in some manner by the legislative branch, and these roles (passing legislation, passing the budget, and making appointments) are all described in the next section, <span style=\"border: none windowtext 0pt; padding: 0;\"><span class=\"import-xref\">\u201c<\/span><span class=\"import-xref\">Legislative Powers<\/span><span class=\"import-xref\">.\u201d<\/span><\/span> The governor, however, still manifests some unilateral powers that are exclusive to the office. The governor addresses the public on an annual basis in the state of the state speech, they have the power to issue executive orders and clemency, and depending on the constitutional limitations, they can potentially succeed themselves in office through reelection (in some cases, indefinitely).<\/p>\n<p class=\"import-p\" style=\"text-indent: 36pt;\">Delivering the state of the state address provides the governor with generally the largest platform for state politics to showcase their successes and highlight their agenda. Much like the \u201cgoing public\u201d approach to public exposure, the annual speech <span style=\"border: none windowtext 0pt; padding: 0;\"><em class=\"import-i\">can<\/em><\/span> serve as the vehicle through which governors can directly reach out to their constituents and garner their support for the issues prioritized for the next year.<sup class=\"import-enref\"><a class=\"footnote\" title=\"Kousser and Phillips, Power of American Governors, 171; Kernell, Going Public.\" id=\"return-footnote-50-40\" href=\"#footnote-50-40\" aria-label=\"Footnote 40\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[40]<\/sup><\/a><\/sup> The impact of the address, however, should not be overstated. Not everyone will tune in to watch, and the audience is much smaller than the State of the Union for obvious and expected reasons. Viewers are more likely to already be paying attention to politics and following along with the major issues at stake.<sup class=\"import-enref\"><a class=\"footnote\" title=\"Wolak and Parinandi, \u201cDoes the Public Hold Governors Accountable?,\u201d 1051\u20131064.\" id=\"return-footnote-50-41\" href=\"#footnote-50-41\" aria-label=\"Footnote 41\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[41]<\/sup><\/a><\/sup> This address does give the governor a unique opportunity to formally speak to all the institutions of state government (with the legislature and key leadership from the judicial branch present) and to connect directly with the public that does care enough to tune in and watch.<\/p>\n<figure id=\"attachment_192\" aria-describedby=\"caption-attachment-192\" style=\"width: 500px\" class=\"wp-caption alignright\"><img class=\"wp-image-192\" src=\"http:\/\/pressbooks.palni.org\/theexcitingdynamicsofstateandlocalgovernment\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/79\/2025\/06\/5.3.jpg\" alt=\"Governor Andrew Cuomo speaks at a podium in a New York City subway.\" width=\"500\" height=\"368\" srcset=\"https:\/\/pressbooks.palni.org\/theexcitingdynamicsofstateandlocalgovernment\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/79\/2025\/06\/5.3.jpg 800w, https:\/\/pressbooks.palni.org\/theexcitingdynamicsofstateandlocalgovernment\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/79\/2025\/06\/5.3-300x221.jpg 300w, https:\/\/pressbooks.palni.org\/theexcitingdynamicsofstateandlocalgovernment\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/79\/2025\/06\/5.3-768x565.jpg 768w, https:\/\/pressbooks.palni.org\/theexcitingdynamicsofstateandlocalgovernment\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/79\/2025\/06\/5.3-65x48.jpg 65w, https:\/\/pressbooks.palni.org\/theexcitingdynamicsofstateandlocalgovernment\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/79\/2025\/06\/5.3-225x166.jpg 225w, https:\/\/pressbooks.palni.org\/theexcitingdynamicsofstateandlocalgovernment\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/79\/2025\/06\/5.3-350x258.jpg 350w\" \/><figcaption id=\"caption-attachment-192\" class=\"wp-caption-text\"><strong>Figure 5.4 &#8211; New York Governor Andrew Cuomo Fields Questions from the Press, 2016<br \/>Source: &#8220;<a href=\"https:\/\/flickr.com\/photos\/61135621@N03\/23887515479\">Governor Cuomo&#8217;s Major Agenda Proposal<\/a>&#8221; by Metropolitan Transportation Authority on Flickr \/ <a href=\"https:\/\/creativecommons.org\/licenses\/by\/2.0\/deed.en\">CC BY<\/a>.<\/strong><\/figcaption><\/figure>\n<p class=\"import-p\" style=\"text-indent: 36pt;\">The governor also holds the authority to issue <span style=\"border: none windowtext 0pt; padding: 0;\"><strong class=\"import-b\">executive orders<\/strong><\/span>\u2014an executive mandate that can sidestep the legislature and policymaking process when necessary. These orders are probably most often recognized when issued to respond to a crisis, whether it is a public health emergency like COVID-19 or a natural disaster.<sup class=\"import-enref\"><a class=\"footnote\" title=\"Gakh et al., \u201cGovernors\u2019 Use of Executive Orders,\u201d 489\u2013495; Weissert et al., \u201cGovernors in Control,\u201d 396\u2013428.\" id=\"return-footnote-50-42\" href=\"#footnote-50-42\" aria-label=\"Footnote 42\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[42]<\/sup><\/a><\/sup> In these cases, the executive order may be a necessary first step to triggering the release of funds or emergency powers granted exclusively during such times of crisis. Less notable but still important, executive orders may be issued to create agencies, boards, or commissions within the executive branch.<sup class=\"import-enref\"><a class=\"footnote\" title=\"Cockerham and Crew, \u201cFactors Affecting Governors\u2019 Decisions,\u201d 6\u201314.\" id=\"return-footnote-50-43\" href=\"#footnote-50-43\" aria-label=\"Footnote 43\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[43]<\/sup><\/a><\/sup><\/p>\n<p class=\"import-p\" style=\"text-indent: 36pt;\">In addition, governors have the ability to offer <span style=\"border: none windowtext 0pt; padding: 0;\"><strong class=\"import-b\">clemency<\/strong><\/span> for a crime. This may be through nullifying the consequences (a pardon), commuting a sentence, or issuing a reprieve or injunction on a sentence.<sup class=\"import-enref\"><a class=\"footnote\" title=\"Ridolfi and Gordon, \u201cGubernatorial Clemency Powers,\u201d 26; Drinan, \u201cClemency in a Time of Crisis,\u201d 1123; Harris and Redmond, \u201cExecutive Clemency,\u201d 2.\" id=\"return-footnote-50-44\" href=\"#footnote-50-44\" aria-label=\"Footnote 44\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[44]<\/sup><\/a><\/sup> The process and power for each of these differs from state to state.<\/p>\n<p class=\"import-p\" style=\"text-indent: 36pt;\"><span style=\"border: none windowtext 0pt; padding: 0;\"><strong class=\"import-b\">Tenure power<\/strong><\/span> includes both the lengths of terms and the ability to succeed oneself in office, serving as an institutional mechanism that enables the governor to expand their reach when few limits and broad authority to these powers exist. A governor has significant tenure power, for example, if they have longer terms and no term limits placed on their service. A governor who is limited to shorter terms and has tight term limits would have less tenure power. This has expanded in most states throughout history, particularly during the reforms to strengthen executive power.<sup class=\"import-enref\"><a class=\"footnote\" title=\"Tarr, Understanding State Constitutions.\" id=\"return-footnote-50-45\" href=\"#footnote-50-45\" aria-label=\"Footnote 45\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[45]<\/sup><\/a><\/sup> Terms for governors in most states are four years (like the terms for the federal chief executive), but New Hampshire and Vermont have two-year terms.<sup class=\"import-enref\"><a class=\"footnote\" title=\"National Governors Association, \u201cGovernors: Powers and Authority.\u201d\" id=\"return-footnote-50-46\" href=\"#footnote-50-46\" aria-label=\"Footnote 46\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[46]<\/sup><\/a><\/sup> Only Virginia prohibits a governor from self-succession, though historically, many of the Southern states had similar limits, reducing the power of governors and making two-term executives (with at least one different governor\u2019s term of service in between) quite challenging and uncommon. The limits on terms vary. Thirty-seven states utilize term limits on their executives, with the most common limit reflecting the national model of a two-term (eight-year total) limit.<sup class=\"import-enref\"><a class=\"footnote\" title=\"Smart and Sturm, \u201cTerm Limits and Electoral Accountability,\u201d 93\u2013102.\" id=\"return-footnote-50-47\" href=\"#footnote-50-47\" aria-label=\"Footnote 47\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[47]<\/sup><\/a><\/sup> Some states include \u201cpauses\u201d for one term (Indiana, Wyoming, and Oregon) or two (Montana) to separate between their two consecutive four-year term limits. Proponents of these barriers argue that they allow for more competition and pressure governors to prioritize their agenda within the deadline of their own term limit.<sup class=\"import-enref\"><a class=\"footnote\" title=\"Smart and Sturm, \u201cTerm Limits and Electoral Accountability,\u201d 93\u2013102; Klarin, Term Length.\" id=\"return-footnote-50-48\" href=\"#footnote-50-48\" aria-label=\"Footnote 48\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[48]<\/sup><\/a><\/sup> Opposition arguments view these as artificial blocks that prevent voters from being able to reelect a candidate if they so choose.<sup class=\"import-enref\"><a class=\"footnote\" title=\"Elhauge, \u201cAre Term Limits Undemocratic?,\u201d 83\u2013201; Ferguson, \u201cGovernors and the Executive Branch,\u201d 208\u2013250.\" id=\"return-footnote-50-49\" href=\"#footnote-50-49\" aria-label=\"Footnote 49\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[49]<\/sup><\/a><\/sup><\/p>\n<h2 class=\"import-bh\">Legislative Powers<\/h2>\n<p class=\"import-paft\">Depending on the organization of the executive branch, governors may have relatively limited unilateral powers. Indeed, most of the powers we often associate with governors have shared elements with the legislature. The governor works with the legislature on budgets and legislation and also in terms of filling appointments. Because of this, the governor has legislative power despite serving as the head of the executive branch.<\/p>\n<p class=\"import-p\" style=\"text-indent: 36pt;\">The budgetary process incorporates both legislative and executive branches of government because of the magnitude of the responsibility and the value of the input both branches can provide. The legislature writes bills that may have appropriations attached and will thus know how much they intend to spend and what legislative responsibilities they are prioritizing. The governor is looking through a statewide lens, though, so they will see items related to the bureaucracy (including the agencies, departments, and commissions) and the needs of the full state that may not be as visible to the legislators. The governor proposes the budget, but both chambers of the legislature must pass it, making it an essential responsibility of both branches.<sup class=\"import-enref\"><a class=\"footnote\" title=\"Kousser and Phillips, Power of American Governors.\" id=\"return-footnote-50-50\" href=\"#footnote-50-50\" aria-label=\"Footnote 50\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[50]<\/sup><\/a><\/sup><\/p>\n<p class=\"import-p\" style=\"text-indent: 36pt;\">The governor serves a similar role in the passing of statewide legislation. Though only a member of the state legislature can draft a bill, the governor has legislative liaisons working closely with and following the efforts of the legislature. If the governor has a strong working relationship and positive reputation with the legislature, they may be effective at convincing legislators to adjust bills to the governor\u2019s preference before the proposed legislation leaves committee, virtually ensuring the governor will proudly sign when it comes to their desk. Governors who do not enjoy such a bond with their lawmaking counterparts may struggle to exert meaningful influence and instead may have to utilize their right to veto legislation that they disapprove of.<\/p>\n<p class=\"import-p\" style=\"text-indent: 36pt;\">These vetoes can take the form of <span style=\"border: none windowtext 0pt; padding: 0;\"><strong class=\"import-b\">line-item vetoes<\/strong><\/span> (striking down specific provisions) or <span style=\"border: none windowtext 0pt; padding: 0;\"><strong class=\"import-b\">pocket vetoes<\/strong><\/span> (intentionally failing to sign a bill into law within a certain period of time before the legislature adjourns).<sup class=\"import-enref\"><a class=\"footnote\" title=\"Carter and Schap, \u201cLine-Item Veto,\u201d 103\u2013118; Lauth, \u201cOther Six,\u201d 26\u201349; McCormack and Reingewertz, \u201cPolitics, Partisanship,\u201d 3546\u20133559.\" id=\"return-footnote-50-51\" href=\"#footnote-50-51\" aria-label=\"Footnote 51\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[51]<\/sup><\/a><\/sup> Often the threat of a veto can be powerful enough, but depending on the partisan and ideological composition of the branches and even the personalities or approaches of the elected officials within them, the legislature can always override the governor\u2019s veto with a supermajority of support.<sup class=\"import-enref\"><a class=\"footnote\" title=\"McGrath, Rogowski, and Ryan et al., \u201cGubernatorial Veto Powers,\u201d 571\u2013598.\" id=\"return-footnote-50-52\" href=\"#footnote-50-52\" aria-label=\"Footnote 52\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[52]<\/sup><\/a><\/sup><\/p>\n<p class=\"import-p\" style=\"text-indent: 36pt;\"><span style=\"border: none windowtext 0pt; padding: 0;\"><strong class=\"import-b\">Appointments<\/strong><\/span> illustrate another facet in which governors are subject to legislative approval, at either the beginning or the end of the appointment process. Some appointments begin with legislative recommendations, where the legislature brings the governor a short list of potential candidates and the governor makes their selections from there. Inversely, another process for appointments gives the governor the authority upfront to make the appointment and then the legislators the power on the back end to either confirm or deny.<\/p>\n<p class=\"import-p\" style=\"text-indent: 36pt;\">These appointments can be wide ranging, from the chief justice for the state supreme court to a small board position on a relatively obscure state commission with relatively limited power and scope. Because of the expansive responsibilities of state government and the modern bureaucratic framework, a governor can have hundreds of potential appointments to fill annually. Many factors can influence whether the process is efficient and effective; it is worth noting, though, that relative to the periodic controversial national appointment that depicts the president at odds with the Senate, most gubernatorial appointments and legislative confirmations are fairly straightforward and subdued.<\/p>\n<h1 class=\"import-ah\">Conclusion<\/h1>\n<p class=\"import-paft\">The executive branch hosts a number of essential offices, including the chief executive, that all share the same objective: to help implement and enforce the laws of the state government. The governor exercises formal powers of office that are outlined in the state constitution and state statutes, including those shared with the legislature, like appointments, passing legislation, and approving budgets. Governors also have informal powers that they bring to the office based on their own personalities, unique backgrounds leading to public service, approaches, or other characteristics that separate them from other elected officials and make them notable to their constituents.<\/p>\n<p class=\"import-p\" style=\"text-indent: 36pt;\">Most of the power in the executive branch, however, is divided and delegated among several offices or branches. Matters of financial responsibility belong to the auditor, treasurer, and\/or comptroller. Issues involving business and election operations fall under the purview of the secretary of state. Legal representation and action belong to the attorneys general. Governors who run on the same ticket as their lieutenant governors might expect that their constitutional subordinates help promote the gubernatorial agenda, but some states allocate more authority and power for this office to exercise.<\/p>\n<p class=\"import-p\" style=\"text-indent: 36pt;\">The greatest limitations of the executive branch, however, lie in its shared and fractured powers. Authority is shared with the legislature on many issues so that the unilateral powers of governors seem limited in comparison. Governors, however, have the authority to issue executive orders, propose a budget, make appointments, and veto legislation, which cumulatively gives the office substantial power.<\/p>\n<div class=\"textbox textbox--key-takeaways\">\n<header class=\"textbox__header\">\n<p class=\"textbox__title\">Bibliography<\/p>\n<\/header>\n<div class=\"textbox__content\">\n<p class=\"hanging-indent\">Abney, Glenn, and Thomas P. Lauth. \u201cThe Governor as Chief Administrator.\u201d <span style=\"border: none windowtext 0pt; padding: 0;\"><em class=\"import-i\">Public Administration Review<\/em><\/span> 43, no. 1 (1983): 40\u201349.<\/p>\n<p class=\"hanging-indent\">Barth, Jay, and Margaret R. Ferguson. \u201cAmerican Governors and Their Constituents: The Relationship Between Gubernatorial Personality and Public Approval.\u201d <span style=\"border: none windowtext 0pt; padding: 0;\"><em class=\"import-i\">State Politics &amp; Policy Quarterly<\/em><\/span> 2, no. 3 (2002): 268\u2013282.<\/p>\n<p class=\"hanging-indent\">Bentley, Andria L. \u201cThe New York State Comptroller as Sole Trustee of the Common Retirement Fund: A Constitutional Guarantee.\u201d <span style=\"border: none windowtext 0pt; padding: 0;\"><em class=\"import-i\">Albany Law Review<\/em><\/span> 72 (2009): 761.<\/p>\n<p class=\"hanging-indent\">Briffault, Richard. \u201cSkelos v. Paterson: The Surprisingly Strong Case for the Governor\u2019s Surprising Power to Appoint a Lieutenant Governor.\u201d <span style=\"border: none windowtext 0pt; padding: 0;\"><em class=\"import-i\">Albany Law Review<\/em><\/span> 73 (2009): 675.<\/p>\n<p class=\"hanging-indent\">Bunch, Beverly S., and Barbara E. Ferrara. \u201cFactors to Consider When Analyzing the Need for an Elected State Treasurer.\u201d <span style=\"border: none windowtext 0pt; padding: 0;\"><em class=\"import-i\">Public Budgeting &amp; Finance<\/em><\/span> 38, no. 4 (2018): 32\u201351.<\/p>\n<p class=\"hanging-indent\">Carsey, Thomas M. <span style=\"border: none windowtext 0pt; padding: 0;\"><em class=\"import-i\">Campaign Dynamics: The Race for Governor<\/em><\/span>. University of Michigan Press, 2009.<\/p>\n<p class=\"hanging-indent\">Carsey, Thomas M., Robert A. Jackson, Melissa Stewart, and James P. Nelson. \u201cStrategic Candidates, Campaign Dynamics, and Campaign Advertising in Gubernatorial Races.\u201d <span style=\"border: none windowtext 0pt; padding: 0;\"><em class=\"import-i\">State Politics &amp; Policy Quarterly<\/em><\/span> 11, no. 3 (2011): 269\u2013298.<\/p>\n<p class=\"hanging-indent\">Carter, John R., and David Schap. \u201cLine-Item Veto: Where Is Thy Sting?\u201d <span style=\"border: none windowtext 0pt; padding: 0;\"><em class=\"import-i\">Journal of Economic Perspectives<\/em><\/span> 4, no. 2 (1990): 103\u2013118.<\/p>\n<p class=\"hanging-indent\">Citron, Danielle Keats. \u201cThe Privacy Policymaking of State Attorneys General.\u201d <span style=\"border: none windowtext 0pt; padding: 0;\"><em class=\"import-i\">Notre Dame Law Review<\/em><\/span> 92 (2016): 747.<\/p>\n<p class=\"hanging-indent\">Cockerham, Alexandra G., and Robert E. Crew Jr. \u201cFactors Affecting Governors\u2019 Decisions to Issue Executive Orders.\u201d <span style=\"border: none windowtext 0pt; padding: 0;\"><em class=\"import-i\">State and Local Government Review<\/em><\/span> 49, no. 1 (2017): 6\u201314.<\/p>\n<p class=\"hanging-indent\">Council of State Governments. <span style=\"border: none windowtext 0pt; padding: 0;\"><em class=\"import-i\">The Book of the States, Volume 53<\/em><\/span>. 2021. Accessed March 14, 2022. <a href=\"https:\/\/www.nga.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2022\/10\/CSG-book-of-the-states-2021.pdf\"><span style=\"border: none windowtext 0pt; padding: 0;\"><span class=\"import-url\">https:\/\/www.nga.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2022\/10\/CSG-book-of-the-states-2021.pdf<\/span><\/span><\/a>.<\/p>\n<p class=\"hanging-indent\">Dinan, John J. <span style=\"border: none windowtext 0pt; padding: 0;\"><em class=\"import-i\">The American State Constitutional Tradition<\/em><\/span>. University Press of Kansas, 2006.<\/p>\n<p class=\"hanging-indent\">Drinan, Cara H. \u201cClemency in a Time of Crisis.\u201d <span style=\"border: none windowtext 0pt; padding: 0;\"><em class=\"import-i\">Georgia State University Law Review<\/em><\/span> 28 (2011): 1123.<\/p>\n<p class=\"hanging-indent\">Earley, Mark L. \u201cSpecial Solicitude: The Growing Power of State Attorneys General.\u201d <span style=\"border: none windowtext 0pt; padding: 0;\"><em class=\"import-i\">University of Richmond Law Review<\/em><\/span> 52 (2017): 561.<\/p>\n<p class=\"hanging-indent\">Elhauge, Einer. \u201cAre Term Limits Undemocratic?\u201d <span style=\"border: none windowtext 0pt; padding: 0;\"><em class=\"import-i\">University of Chicago Law Review<\/em><\/span> 64, no. 1 (1997): 83\u2013201.<\/p>\n<p class=\"hanging-indent\">Ferguson, Margaret. \u201cGovernors and the Executive Branch.\u201d In <span style=\"border: none windowtext 0pt; padding: 0;\"><em class=\"import-i\">Politics in the American States: A Comparative Analysis<\/em><\/span>, edited by V. Gray, R. L. Hanson, and T. Kousser, 208\u2013250. Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2013.<\/p>\n<p class=\"hanging-indent\">Freedman, Eric, and Daniel Thai. \u201cLittle Newspaper Coverage for Lt. Governor Candidates.\u201d <span style=\"border: none windowtext 0pt; padding: 0;\"><em class=\"import-i\">Newspaper Research Journal<\/em><\/span> 27, no. 3 (2006): 82\u2013100.<\/p>\n<p class=\"hanging-indent\">Gakh, Maxim, Gregory Sunshine, Alexa Limeres, and Lainie Rutkow. \u201cGovernors\u2019 Use of Executive Orders and Proclamations in Hurricane Response, 2006\u20132018.\u201d <span style=\"border: none windowtext 0pt; padding: 0;\"><em class=\"import-i\">Health Security<\/em><\/span> 18, no. 6 (2020): 489\u2013495.<\/p>\n<p class=\"hanging-indent\">Hamman, John A. \u201cCareer Experience and Performing Effectively as Governor.\u201d <span style=\"border: none windowtext 0pt; padding: 0;\"><em class=\"import-i\">American Review of Public Administration<\/em><\/span> 34, no. 2 (2004): 151\u2013163.<\/p>\n<p class=\"hanging-indent\">Harris, Jonathan, and Lothlorien Redmond. \u201cExecutive Clemency: The Lethal Absence of Hope.\u201d <span style=\"border: none windowtext 0pt; padding: 0;\"><em class=\"import-i\">Criminal Law Brief<\/em><\/span> 3 (2007): 2.<\/p>\n<p class=\"hanging-indent\">Herzik, Eric B., and Charles W. Wiggins. \u201cGovernors vs. Legislatures: Vetoes, Overrides, and Policy Making in the American States.\u201d <span style=\"border: none windowtext 0pt; padding: 0;\"><em class=\"import-i\">Policy Studies Journal<\/em><\/span> 17, no. 4 (1989): 841.<\/p>\n<p class=\"hanging-indent\">Hevesi, G. Alan. \u201cStandards for Internal Control in New York State Government.\u201d 2005. <a href=\"https:\/\/ms.hmb.gov.tr\/uploads\/2019\/01\/intcontrol_stds.pdf\"><span style=\"border: none windowtext 0pt; padding: 0;\"><span class=\"import-url\">https:\/\/ms.hmb.gov.tr\/uploads\/2019\/01\/intcontrol_stds.pdf<\/span><\/span><\/a>.<\/p>\n<p class=\"hanging-indent\">Hornbeck, Dustin, and Joel Malin. \u201cState Auditors in Education Policy.\u201d <span style=\"border: none windowtext 0pt; padding: 0;\"><em class=\"import-i\">Educational Policy<\/em><\/span> 33, no. 7 (2019): 1047\u20131075.<\/p>\n<p class=\"hanging-indent\">Jensen, Ulrich Thy, Dominic Rohner, Olivier Bornet, et al. \u201cCombating COVID-19 with Charisma: Evidence on Governor Speeches in the United States.\u201d <span style=\"border: none windowtext 0pt; padding: 0;\"><em class=\"import-i\">Leadership Quarterly<\/em><\/span> 34, no. 6 (2023): 101702.<\/p>\n<p class=\"hanging-indent\">Kernell, Samuel. <span style=\"border: none windowtext 0pt; padding: 0;\"><em class=\"import-i\">Going Public: New Strategies <\/em><em class=\"import-i\">of<\/em><em class=\"import-i\"> Presidential Leadership<\/em><\/span>. CQ Press, 2006.<\/p>\n<p class=\"hanging-indent\">Klarin, Jonas. <span style=\"border: none windowtext 0pt; padding: 0;\"><em class=\"import-i\">Term Length and Public Finances: The Case of US Governors<\/em><\/span>. Uppsala University, 2019.<\/p>\n<p class=\"hanging-indent\">Kousser, Thad, and Justin H. Phillips. <span style=\"border: none windowtext 0pt; padding: 0;\"><em class=\"import-i\">The Power of American Governors: Winning on Budgets and Losing on Policy<\/em><\/span>. Cambridge University Press, 2012.<\/p>\n<p class=\"hanging-indent\">Krause, George A., and Benjamin F. Melusky. \u201cConcentrated Powers: Unilateral Executive Authority and Fiscal Policy Making in the American States.\u201d <span style=\"border: none windowtext 0pt; padding: 0;\"><em class=\"import-i\">Journal of Politics<\/em><\/span> 74, no. 1 (2012): 98\u2013112.<\/p>\n<p class=\"hanging-indent\">Lauth, Thomas P. \u201cThe Other Six: Governors Without the Line-Item Veto.\u201d <span style=\"border: none windowtext 0pt; padding: 0;\"><em class=\"import-i\">Public Budgeting &amp; Finance<\/em><\/span> 36, no. 4 (2016): 26\u201349.<\/p>\n<p class=\"hanging-indent\">Lynch, Travis. \u201cThe Problem with the Lieutenant Governor: A Legislative or Executive Position Under the Separation of Powers Clause.\u201d <span style=\"border: none windowtext 0pt; padding: 0;\"><em class=\"import-i\">Supra<\/em><\/span> 84 (2015): 87.<\/p>\n<p class=\"hanging-indent\">Marshall, William P. \u201cBreak Up the Presidency? Governors, State Attorneys, General and Lessons from the Divided Executive.\u201d <span style=\"border: none windowtext 0pt; padding: 0;\"><em class=\"import-i\">Yale Law Journal<\/em><\/span> 115 (2005): 2446.<\/p>\n<p class=\"hanging-indent\">Matheson, Scott M., Jr. \u201cConstitutional Status and Role of the State Attorney General.\u201d <span style=\"border: none windowtext 0pt; padding: 0;\"><em class=\"import-i\">University of Florida Journal of Law and Public Policy<\/em><\/span> 6 (1993): 1.<\/p>\n<p class=\"hanging-indent\">McCormack, Joseph, and Yaniv Reingewertz. \u201cPolitics, Partisanship and the Power to Veto: Does Gubernatorial Line-Item Veto Power Affect State Budgets?\u201d <span style=\"border: none windowtext 0pt; padding: 0;\"><em class=\"import-i\">Applied Economics<\/em><\/span> 50, no. 33 (2018): 3546\u20133559.<\/p>\n<p class=\"hanging-indent\">McGrath, Robert J., Jon C. Rogowski, and Josh M. Ryan. \u201cGubernatorial Veto Powers and the Size of Legislative Coalitions.\u201d <span style=\"border: none windowtext 0pt; padding: 0;\"><em class=\"import-i\">Legislative Studies Quarterly<\/em><\/span> 40, no. 4 (2015): 571\u2013598.<\/p>\n<p class=\"hanging-indent\">McGrath, Robert J., Jon C. Rogowski, and Josh M. Ryan. \u201cThe Power of Institutional Design: Governors, Vetoes, and Legislative Outcomes.\u201d In <span style=\"border: none windowtext 0pt; padding: 0;\"><em class=\"import-i\">The American Governor: Power, Constraint, and Leadership in the States<\/em><\/span>, 31\u201347. New York: Palgrave Macmillan US, 2015.<\/p>\n<p class=\"hanging-indent\">McLeod, Aman. \u201cThe Party on the Bench: Partisanship, Judicial Selection Commissions, and State High-Court Appointments.\u201d <span style=\"border: none windowtext 0pt; padding: 0;\"><em class=\"import-i\">Justice System Journal<\/em><\/span> 33, no. 3 (2012): 262\u2013274.<\/p>\n<p class=\"hanging-indent\">Miller, Mark C. \u201cState Attorneys General, Political Lawsuits, and Their Collective Voice in the Inter-Institutional Constitutional Dialogue.\u201d <span style=\"border: none windowtext 0pt; padding: 0;\"><em class=\"import-i\">Journal of Legislation<\/em><\/span> 48 (2021): 1.<\/p>\n<p class=\"hanging-indent\">Montjoy, Robert S. \u201cThe Public Administration of Elections.\u201d <span style=\"border: none windowtext 0pt; padding: 0;\"><em class=\"import-i\">Public Administration Review<\/em><\/span> 68, no. 5 (2008): 788\u2013799.<\/p>\n<p class=\"hanging-indent\">Morehouse, Sarah McCally. <span style=\"border: none windowtext 0pt; padding: 0;\"><em class=\"import-i\">The Governor as Party Leader: Campaigning and Governing<\/em><\/span>. University of Michigan Press, 1998.<\/p>\n<p class=\"hanging-indent\">National Governors Association. \u201cGovernors: Powers and Authority.\u201d 2024. <a href=\"https:\/\/www.nga.org\/governors\/powers-and-authority\/\"><span style=\"border: none windowtext 0pt; padding: 0;\"><span class=\"import-url\">https:\/\/www.nga.org\/governors\/powers-and-authority\/<\/span><\/span><\/a>.<\/p>\n<p class=\"hanging-indent\">Priest, Sharon. \u201cThe Secretaries Speak: Sixteen Points to Improve American Elections.\u201d <span style=\"border: none windowtext 0pt; padding: 0;\"><em class=\"import-i\">Election Law Journal<\/em><\/span> 1, no. 1 (2002): 71\u201374.<\/p>\n<p class=\"hanging-indent\">Ridolfi, Kathleen, and Seth Gordon. \u201cGubernatorial Clemency Powers: Justice or Mercy.\u201d <span style=\"border: none windowtext 0pt; padding: 0;\"><em class=\"import-i\">Criminal Justice<\/em><\/span> 24 (2009): 26.<\/p>\n<p class=\"hanging-indent\">Rubin, Irene. \u201cThe State of State Budget Research.\u201d <span style=\"border: none windowtext 0pt; padding: 0;\"><em class=\"import-i\">Public Budgeting &amp; Finance<\/em><\/span> 25, no. 4s (2005): 46\u201367.<\/p>\n<p class=\"hanging-indent\">Schelker, Mark. \u201cPublic Auditors: Empirical Evidence from the US States.\u201d Available at SSRN 957528 (2008). <a href=\"https:\/\/papers.ssrn.com\/sol3\/papers.cfm?abstract_id=957528\"><span style=\"border: none windowtext 0pt; padding: 0;\"><span class=\"import-url\">https:\/\/papers.ssrn.com\/sol3\/papers.cfm?abstract_id=957528<\/span><\/span><\/a>.<\/p>\n<p class=\"hanging-indent\">Schwartz, Robert. \u201cCoping with the Effectiveness Dilemma: Strategies Adopted by State Auditors.\u201d <span style=\"border: none windowtext 0pt; padding: 0;\"><em class=\"import-i\">International Review of Administrative Sciences<\/em><\/span> 65, no. 4 (1999): 511\u2013526.<\/p>\n<p class=\"hanging-indent\">Silver, Nate. \u201cThe Governors\u2019 Advantage in Presidential Races Is Bigger Than You Thought.\u201d FiveThirtyEight, June 15, 2011. <span style=\"border: none windowtext 0pt; padding: 0;\"><a class=\"rId112\" href=\"https:\/\/fivethirtyeight.com\/features\/the-governors-advantage-in-presidential-races-is-bigger-than-you-thought\/\"><span class=\"import-url\">https:\/\/fivethirtyeight.com\/features\/the-governors-advantage-in-presidential-races-is-bigger-than-you-thought\/<\/span><\/a><\/span>.<\/p>\n<p class=\"hanging-indent\">Smart, Michael, and Daniel M. Sturm. \u201cTerm Limits and Electoral Accountability.\u201d <span style=\"border: none windowtext 0pt; padding: 0;\"><em class=\"import-i\">Journal of Public Economics<\/em><\/span> 107 (2013): 93\u2013102.<\/p>\n<p class=\"hanging-indent\">Tarr, G. Alan. <span style=\"border: none windowtext 0pt; padding: 0;\"><em class=\"import-i\">Understanding State Constitutions<\/em><\/span>. Princeton University Press, 2000.<\/p>\n<p class=\"hanging-indent\">Warnick, Ashlie C. \u201cThe Impact of Shifting from an Annual Federal Budget Cycle to a Biennial Budget Cycle: A Look at the States and the Implications for Congress.\u201d Available at SSRN 1081608 (2008). <span style=\"border: none windowtext 0pt; padding: 0;\"><a class=\"rId113\" href=\"https:\/\/papers.ssrn.com\/sol3\/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1081608\"><span class=\"import-url\">https:\/\/papers.ssrn.com\/sol3\/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1081608<\/span><\/a><\/span>.<\/p>\n<p class=\"hanging-indent\">Weissert, Carol S., Matthew J. Uttermark, Kenneth R. Mackie, and Alexandra Artiles. \u201cGovernors in Control: Executive Orders, State-Local Preemption, and the COVID-19 Pandemic.\u201d <span style=\"border: none windowtext 0pt; padding: 0;\"><em class=\"import-i\">Publius: The Journal of Federalism<\/em><\/span> 51, no. 3 (2021): 396\u2013428.<\/p>\n<p class=\"hanging-indent\">Wilkins, Vicky M., and Garry Young. \u201cThe Influence of Governors on Veto Override Attempts: A Test of Pivotal Politics.\u201d <span style=\"border: none windowtext 0pt; padding: 0;\"><em class=\"import-i\">Legislative Studies Quarterly<\/em><\/span> 27, no. 4 (2002): 557\u2013575.<\/p>\n<p class=\"hanging-indent\">Winder, David W., and David Hill. \u201cThe Governor and the Lieutenant Governor: Forms of Cooperation Between Two State Executives.\u201d <span style=\"border: none windowtext 0pt; padding: 0;\"><em class=\"import-i\">Politics &amp; Policy<\/em><\/span> 34, no. 3 (2006): 634\u2013656.<\/p>\n<p class=\"hanging-indent\">Wolak, Jennifer, and Srinivas Parinandi. \u201cDoes the Public Hold Governors Accountable for Policy Outcomes?\u201d <span style=\"border: none windowtext 0pt; padding: 0;\"><em class=\"import-i\">Political Research Quarterly<\/em><\/span> 75, no. 4 (2022): 1051\u20131064.<\/p>\n<p class=\"hanging-indent\">Woods, Neal D., and Michael Baranowski. \u201cGovernors and the Bureaucracy: Executive Resources as Sources of Administrative Influence.\u201d <span style=\"border: none windowtext 0pt; padding: 0;\"><em class=\"import-i\">International Journal of Public Administration<\/em><\/span> 30, no. 11 (2007): 1219\u20131230.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<hr class=\"before-footnotes clear\" \/><div class=\"footnotes\"><ol><li id=\"footnote-50-1\">Abney and Lauth, \u201cGovernor as Chief Administrator.\u201d <a href=\"#return-footnote-50-1\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 1\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-50-2\">Hamman, \u201cCareer Experience.\u201d <a href=\"#return-footnote-50-2\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 2\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-50-3\">National Governors Association, \u201cGovernors: Powers and Authority.\u201d <a href=\"#return-footnote-50-3\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 3\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-50-4\">Dinan, American State Constitutional Tradition. <a href=\"#return-footnote-50-4\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 4\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-50-5\">Tarr, Understanding State Constitutions, 72. <a href=\"#return-footnote-50-5\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 5\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-50-6\">Kousser and Phillips, Power of American Governors, 17. <a href=\"#return-footnote-50-6\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 6\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-50-7\">Tarr, Understanding State Constitutions, 156; National Governors Association, \u201cGovernors: Powers and Authority\u201d; Woods and Baranowski, \u201cGovernors and the Bureaucracy.\u201d <a href=\"#return-footnote-50-7\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 7\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-50-8\">McLeod, \u201cParty on the Bench.\u201d <a href=\"#return-footnote-50-8\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 8\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-50-9\">Council of State Governments, Book of the States. <a href=\"#return-footnote-50-9\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 9\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-50-10\">Kousser and Phillips, Power of American Governors. <a href=\"#return-footnote-50-10\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 10\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-50-11\">McGrath, Rogowski, and Ryan et al., \u201cPower of Institutional Design,\u201d 31\u201347; Wilkins and Young, \u201cInfluence of Governors,\u201d 557\u2013575; Kousser and Phillips, Power of American Governors. <a href=\"#return-footnote-50-11\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 11\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-50-12\">Herzik and Wiggins, \u201cGovernors vs. Legislatures,\u201d 841. <a href=\"#return-footnote-50-12\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 12\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-50-13\">Carsey, Campaign Dynamics. <a href=\"#return-footnote-50-13\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 13\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-50-14\">Silver, \u201cGovernors\u2019 Advantage.\u201d <a href=\"#return-footnote-50-14\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 14\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-50-15\">Jensen et al., \u201cCombating COVID-19,\u201d 101702; Barth and Ferguson, \u201cAmerican Governors,\u201d 268\u2013282; Carsey et al., \u201cStrategic Candidates,\u201d 269\u2013298. <a href=\"#return-footnote-50-15\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 15\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-50-16\">Morehouse, Governor as Party Leader. <a href=\"#return-footnote-50-16\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 16\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-50-17\">Briffault, \u201cSkelos v. Paterson,\u201d 675. <a href=\"#return-footnote-50-17\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 17\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-50-18\">Some states have recently added the role of a lieutenant governor, but it was not originally in their state constitution. Arizona voters approved this new post in 2022 to go into effect in 2026, while New Jersey created the position in 2005 with the first lieutenant governor elected in 2010. <a href=\"#return-footnote-50-18\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 18\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-50-19\">Freedman and Thai, \u201cLittle Newspaper Coverage,\u201d 82\u2013100. <a href=\"#return-footnote-50-19\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 19\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-50-20\">Winder and Hill, \u201cGovernor and the Lieutenant Governor,\u201d 634\u2013656. <a href=\"#return-footnote-50-20\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 20\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-50-21\">Briffault, \u201cSkelos v. Paterson,\u201d 675. <a href=\"#return-footnote-50-21\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 21\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-50-22\">Lynch, \u201cProblem with the Lieutenant Governor,\u201d 87. <a href=\"#return-footnote-50-22\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 22\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-50-23\">Winder and Hill, \u201cGovernor and the Lieutenant Governor,\u201d 634\u2013656. <a href=\"#return-footnote-50-23\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 23\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-50-24\">Marshall, \u201cBreak Up the Presidency,\u201d 2446. <a href=\"#return-footnote-50-24\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 24\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-50-25\">Matheson, \u201cConstitutional Status and Role,\u201d 1. <a href=\"#return-footnote-50-25\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 25\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-50-26\">Citron, \u201cPrivacy Policymaking,\u201d 747; Marshall, \u201cBreak Up the Presidency,\u201d 2446. <a href=\"#return-footnote-50-26\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 26\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-50-27\">Miller, \u201cState Attorneys General,\u201d 1. <a href=\"#return-footnote-50-27\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 27\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-50-28\">Earley, \u201cSpecial Solicitude,\u201d 561. <a href=\"#return-footnote-50-28\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 28\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-50-29\">Montjoy, \u201cPublic Administration of Elections,\u201d 788\u2013799; Priest, \u201cSecretaries Speak,\u201d 71\u201374. <a href=\"#return-footnote-50-29\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 29\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-50-30\">Council of State Governments, Book of the States.\u201cBook of the States, Volume 53.\u201d <a href=\"#return-footnote-50-30\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 30\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-50-31\">Schwartz, \u201cCoping with the Effectiveness Dilemma,\u201d 511\u2013526. <a href=\"#return-footnote-50-31\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 31\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-50-32\">Schelker, \u201cPublic Auditors.\u201d <a href=\"#return-footnote-50-32\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 32\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-50-33\">Hornbeck and Malin, \u201cState Auditors,\u201d 1047\u20131075. <a href=\"#return-footnote-50-33\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 33\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-50-34\">Bentley, \u201cNew York State Comptroller,\u201d 761. <a href=\"#return-footnote-50-34\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 34\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-50-35\">Hevesi, \u201cStandards for Internal Control.\u201d <a href=\"#return-footnote-50-35\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 35\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-50-36\">Bunch and Ferrara, \u201cFactors to Consider,\u201d 32\u201351. <a href=\"#return-footnote-50-36\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 36\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-50-37\">Rubin, \u201cState of State Budget Research,\u201d 46\u201367. <a href=\"#return-footnote-50-37\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 37\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-50-38\">Warnick, \u201cImpact of Shifting.\u201d <a href=\"#return-footnote-50-38\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 38\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-50-39\">Krause and Melusky, \u201cConcentrated Powers,\u201d 98\u2013112. <a href=\"#return-footnote-50-39\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 39\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-50-40\">Kousser and Phillips, Power of American Governors, 171; Kernell, Going Public. <a href=\"#return-footnote-50-40\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 40\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-50-41\">Wolak and Parinandi, \u201cDoes the Public Hold Governors Accountable?,\u201d 1051\u20131064. <a href=\"#return-footnote-50-41\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 41\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-50-42\">Gakh et al., \u201cGovernors\u2019 Use of Executive Orders,\u201d 489\u2013495; Weissert et al., \u201cGovernors in Control,\u201d 396\u2013428. <a href=\"#return-footnote-50-42\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 42\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-50-43\">Cockerham and Crew, \u201cFactors Affecting Governors\u2019 Decisions,\u201d 6\u201314. <a href=\"#return-footnote-50-43\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 43\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-50-44\">Ridolfi and Gordon, \u201cGubernatorial Clemency Powers,\u201d 26; Drinan, \u201cClemency in a Time of Crisis,\u201d 1123; Harris and Redmond, \u201cExecutive Clemency,\u201d 2. <a href=\"#return-footnote-50-44\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 44\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-50-45\">Tarr, Understanding State Constitutions. <a href=\"#return-footnote-50-45\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 45\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-50-46\">National Governors Association, \u201cGovernors: Powers and Authority.\u201d <a href=\"#return-footnote-50-46\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 46\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-50-47\">Smart and Sturm, \u201cTerm Limits and Electoral Accountability,\u201d 93\u2013102. <a href=\"#return-footnote-50-47\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 47\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-50-48\">Smart and Sturm, \u201cTerm Limits and Electoral Accountability,\u201d 93\u2013102; Klarin, Term Length. <a href=\"#return-footnote-50-48\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 48\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-50-49\">Elhauge, \u201cAre Term Limits Undemocratic?,\u201d 83\u2013201; Ferguson, \u201cGovernors and the Executive Branch,\u201d 208\u2013250. <a href=\"#return-footnote-50-49\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 49\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-50-50\">Kousser and Phillips, Power of American Governors. <a href=\"#return-footnote-50-50\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 50\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-50-51\">Carter and Schap, \u201cLine-Item Veto,\u201d 103\u2013118; Lauth, \u201cOther Six,\u201d 26\u201349; McCormack and Reingewertz, \u201cPolitics, Partisanship,\u201d 3546\u20133559. <a href=\"#return-footnote-50-51\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 51\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-50-52\">McGrath, Rogowski, and Ryan et al., \u201cGubernatorial Veto Powers,\u201d 571\u2013598. <a href=\"#return-footnote-50-52\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 52\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><\/ol><\/div>","protected":false},"author":3,"menu_order":10,"template":"","meta":{"pb_show_title":"on","pb_short_title":"","pb_subtitle":"","pb_authors":["laura-merrifield-wilson"],"pb_section_license":""},"chapter-type":[],"contributor":[62],"license":[],"part":3,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.palni.org\/theexcitingdynamicsofstateandlocalgovernment\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapters\/50"}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.palni.org\/theexcitingdynamicsofstateandlocalgovernment\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapters"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.palni.org\/theexcitingdynamicsofstateandlocalgovernment\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/chapter"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.palni.org\/theexcitingdynamicsofstateandlocalgovernment\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/3"}],"version-history":[{"count":21,"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.palni.org\/theexcitingdynamicsofstateandlocalgovernment\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapters\/50\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":517,"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.palni.org\/theexcitingdynamicsofstateandlocalgovernment\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapters\/50\/revisions\/517"}],"part":[{"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.palni.org\/theexcitingdynamicsofstateandlocalgovernment\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/parts\/3"}],"metadata":[{"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.palni.org\/theexcitingdynamicsofstateandlocalgovernment\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapters\/50\/metadata\/"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.palni.org\/theexcitingdynamicsofstateandlocalgovernment\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=50"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"chapter-type","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.palni.org\/theexcitingdynamicsofstateandlocalgovernment\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapter-type?post=50"},{"taxonomy":"contributor","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.palni.org\/theexcitingdynamicsofstateandlocalgovernment\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/contributor?post=50"},{"taxonomy":"license","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.palni.org\/theexcitingdynamicsofstateandlocalgovernment\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/license?post=50"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}